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Our Selma Is Here: The Political and Legal 
Struggle for Educational Equality in Denver, 
Colorado, and Multiracial Conundrums in 
American Jurisprudence 
Tom I. Romero II1 
 
In late October 1968, the Denver Board of Education for School District 
Number One of the City and County of Denver (the School Board) held its 
monthly meeting.2  Like most of its recent meetings, the gathering of the 
School Board promised to provoke a heated exchange over the efficacy of 
Superintendent Dr. Robert Gilberts’s plan (the Gilberts Plan) to desegregate 
the district’s schools.3  As a sizeable crowd filed into the auditorium, a large 
and boisterous group of Chicanos made their presence known.4  Singing We 
Shall Overcome loudly in Spanish, the “Chicano”5 attendees occupied 
several seats near the stage.  Not long into the meeting, Rodolfo “Corky” 
Gonzales, the well-known ex-prize fighter, emerged from the crowd.6  
Gonzales “stepped to the speaker’s platform, accompanied by several black-
bereted followers,” who proceeded to form a semicircle around him.7  
Although Gonzales had been scheduled to make a statement before the 
School Board later in the evening, he instead used an intermission in the 
proceedings to give his own impression on the Gilberts Plan.8 
The president of the School Board immediately demanded that Gonzales 
step down and ordered the microphone and television cameras shut off.9  
Undeterred, Gonzales pulled out a bullhorn and then proceeded to read a 
two-page statement demanding, among other things, that any equality of 
educational opportunity plan include provisions for bilingual education, 
community control of schools, and a Chicano-based curriculum.10  
According to Gonzales, the Gilberts Plan, which called for limited busing of 
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minority students, failed on all accounts and by this measure was 
“misleading, false, facetious and pretentious” to the goal of desegregation .11   
At the conclusion of his statement, Gonzales declared that integration, 
particularly the solution of busing, “[is] obviously not a panacea . . . [it] 
won’t solve the problems of Mexican American youth.”12  Gonzales warned 
that if the Gilberts Plan were instituted “the future may hold the burning of 
racist books, boycotts of schools, and vacant lots where schools now 
stand.”13  Then, Gonzales and nearly one hundred Chicano supporters 
emptied the room, leaving board members Allegra Saunders, A. Edgar 
Benton, Dr. John Amesse, and Superintendent Robert Gilberts to try to 
restore order.14 
The demands made by Gonzales on behalf of Denver’s Chicano youth 
typified the complexities of school integration in cities with racially diverse 
student populations during the desegregation era.  Providing education to a 
geographically, racially, and ethnically broad student body, the Denver 
Public School (DPS) system attempted to balance a host of conflicting 
demands made upon educators, administrators, students, parents, and 
teachers in the Denver metropolitan area.  In 1969, “Negro,” “Hispano,” 
and “Anglo” parents sued the DPS Board on behalf of their children 
because it was unable to respond effectively to many of these challenges.15  
This case, Keyes v. School District No. 1, received national attention, 
becoming the first non-southern school desegregation case heard by the 
United States Supreme Court.16   
Significantly, Keyes posed a set of questions never before encountered by 
the Supreme Court.  Chief among such questions was how segregation 
would be determined and integration achieved in a city not split along black 
and white lines.17  While non-white and non-black students, parents, and 
activists like Rodolfo Gonzales struggled for a culturally wide-ranging and 
racially sophisticated concept of school desegregation, the ultimate inability 
of the then-current constitutional jurisprudence to articulate a meaningful 
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understanding of a multiracial student body severely fractured the political 
and legal efforts to integrate Denver’s public schools. 
This article analyzes the attempts by Denver’s administrators, parents, 
students, and courts to achieve equality of educational opportunity among a 
racially diverse student body.  Although this struggle is rooted in the 
revolution catalyzed by Brown v. Board of Education,18 it both predates the 
Brown decision and signifies the extent to which distinctive multiracial 
tensions and experiences emerged outside of those encountered by courts 
deciding cases based in the Jim Crow American South.19  The article begins 
its discussion in part I with a narrative describing the DPS system’s attempt 
to integrate Chicano students by adopting a philosophy of cultural pluralism 
in the classroom and in the curriculum in the late 1940s and 1950s.  
Although at the outset administrators believed that this philosophy would 
serve as a model for racial relations in Denver’s public schools, in time the 
method proved incapable of diffusing the multiple and divergent color lines 
taking shape in the city.     
Part II addresses the experiences of African American students in the 
same system during the 1950s and 1960s.  In a series of highly contested 
administrative decisions regarding school boundaries and attendance 
policies during this time, the DPS system exacerbated the problem of school 
segregation caused, in part, by residential segregation.  As a result, African 
American parents and students who were dissatisfied with identifiable racial 
schools in the DPS forced administrators into a grudging acknowledgment 
of widespread racial inequality in the multiracial school district.  However, 
it was not until 1968 and 1969 that the Denver School Board attempted to 
respond systematically to the inequality and segregation of its schools. 
Part III analyzes a series of school walk outs in the late 1960s by Chicano 
students, parents, and activists.  Although these parents, students, and 
activists mobilized against discriminatory treatment directed against 
Chicano students, their protests fundamentally challenged the ability of the 
DPS to provide equal education for all of its students.  Similar to well-
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known nonviolent civil rights protests in the American South, the Chicano 
demand for educational equality turned into a violent and bloody 
confrontation.20  Denver’s Chicanos declared that their “Selma [was] 
here,”21 claiming that educational equality was as essential to the American 
creed as the civil rights demands of African Americans.  However, these 
students, parents, and activists articulated a much different vision of 
integration than the ones proposed by many in Denver as well as the 
nation’s white and black communities.   
Such issues passionately intersected with the filing of Keyes in 1969.  As 
Judge William Doyle of the United States District Court, Colorado, quickly 
discovered, there were inherent problems in applying the Constitution to 
populations where the question of “majority” and “minority” were not clear.  
Part IV of the article examines the legal foreground of school desegregation 
in the Denver metropolitan area and the jurisprudential resolution of the 
questions raised by a multiracial student body.  The Keyes case focused not 
only on the discriminatory actions of the School Board, but also on the 
social, economic, and political place that Denver’s Mexican American 
community held vis-à-vis whites and blacks.  To the extent that different 
racial groups in the city had dissimilar visions of educational opportunity, 
this section unravels the difficult decisions that the federal courts made in 
giving meaning to and ultimately collapsing racial differences among 
Denver’s communities.   
By 1975, appellate decisions and an amendment to the Colorado 
Constitution left the future of educational equality in the tri-ethnic DPS 
system on very uncertain ground, while simultaneously solidifying the clear 
racial polarization of the city.  In a city divided along black, brown, and 
white lines, the issue of educational and social equity posed complicated 
and multifaceted questions not envisioned by the court-ordered biracial 
desegregation strategies applied in the American South.  Indeed, as the 
United States Supreme Court explicitly suggested when it made its decision, 
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Denver’s “tri-ethnic” or, perhaps more accurately, “tri-racial” situation had 
national implications for a rapidly transforming United States.22    
I.  THE “DENVER EXPERIMENT”: MEXICAN AMERICANS AND 
CULTURAL PLURALISM IN DENVER’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS    
Beginning shortly after the end of the World War II, DPS administrators 
and educators confronted the issue of how to assimilate a newly diverse 
ethnic and racial student body.  Unlike some metropolitan areas in the 
American West, the DPS never adopted an official and explicit policy of 
racial or ethnic segregation of its classrooms, nor did state law legally 
prescribe such a result.23  As the shifting boundaries of Denver’s diverse 
populations brought racial tension, especially between Mexican Americans 
and other racial groups, directly into the area’s schools, Denver’s 
demographic transformation in the middle of the twentieth century forced 
the DPS to confront the meaning of educational equality.24  As a result, DPS 
officials, as well as parents and civil rights activists, hoped that a 
pedagogical practice known as “cultural pluralism” would bring about 
positive results.  According to one proponent of this philosophy,  
modern educators have confirmed the principle that the public 
schools and the public school curriculum should properly reflect 
the total culture.  Now, we who are cultural pluralists or 
intercultural educationists, insist that the total culture does not 
mean only the dominant culture.  The total culture embraces every 
ethnic, racial, or religious group in our midst.25 
Dubbed by one commentator as the “Denver Experiment,” the DPS’s early 
post-World War II cultural pluralism programs highlighted the difficulties 
of embracing “every ethnic, racial, or religious group” in the public school 
system.26     
The DPS’s first indication of systemic deficiency came soon after the end 
of World War II when Denver teachers lobbied the school board for 
information and material regarding the many groups residing in the city.27  
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These teachers wanted to include in their curriculum a study of the ethnic 
and racial geography and history of Denver including “which racial groups 
settled here, where they came from, why they left their previous homes, 
why they came here, what they found, how they adjusted themselves to the 
physical and social conditions, and what share each group has had in the 
building of our city as we know it today.”28  Yet, the recognition of the 
diversity of Denver’s citizenry was not the sole reason behind such 
curricular changes.  Rather, tensions between Mexican American students 
and other groups in junior high and high school compelled Denver 
educators to speed the process of “intercultural” exchange and education.29  
As a result, the DPS developed two specific divergent intercultural 
programs to resolve racial differences and discrimination among these 
groups.   
The first project developed out of a desire by DPS educators to develop 
an “intergroup” curriculum beginning as early as 1947.30  One of the 
outcomes of this work was an effort to develop knowledge about the 
different “Americans” in the public schools.31 A group of Denver junior 
high teachers coordinated the first project in 1951.32 The teachers, with the 
support of several principals, school administrators, and community 
activists, produced the first and only textbook called The People of Denver: 
Book One, Spanish-Speaking People.33  The book attempted to “set forth 
pertinent information” about Denver’s most recent newcomers through 
historical narrative, oral testimony, and illustration.34  From the housing 
trials and tribulations of the Martinez family to the discriminatory treatment 
in employment experienced by Victor Joseph, the book personified the 
ways that many Mexican Americans had been relegated to the lowest rungs 
of Denver’s social order.35   
The DPS and the Mayor’s Commission on Human Relations established 
the second broader-based program in 1953.36  This program, called the City-
School Project (the Project) attempted to address the high delinquency, 
truancy, and dropout rates among the city’s Spanish American youth.37  The 
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goal of the Project was simple: “[a]s the public schools are the nation’s 
time-honored assimilative institution, what is more natural under American 
customs than that the city and its public schools should work together to 
bring about the complete integration of Spanish-surnamed citizens.”38   
The Project’s strategies to “integrate” the Denver’s Mexican American 
youth ranged from after-school reading programs to health service clinics.  
Through these efforts, the Project proponents hoped to promote 
understanding about Denver’s Mexican Americans and tolerance among 
those school and government officials and administrators who came into 
daily contact with the larger community.39  As DPS administrators took 
explicit notice of multiracial differences in the schools, it became evident 
that the intercultural approach to education attempted by these programs 
would not be able to overcome these divides.   
On the one hand, the Project catalyzed intense and often positive 
engagements between municipal bureaucrats, parents, students, and 
community activists.40  On the other hand, some programs produced and 
sponsored by Project educators tended to focus on Mexican Americans in 
negative ways.41  At the inception of the Project, for instance, one DPS 
principal made the following observation: “[n]ow that there are more of the 
Spanish Americans, they feel there is safety in number[s]. . . . Because most 
of them are not so large and strong as the average Anglo, they feel they 
have to use clubs, knives, and other weapons.”42  Accordingly, the question 
of cultural pluralism did not revolve around the issue of how Mexican 
Americans culturally contributed to the educational process; rather, as one 
teacher adamantly declared, the question is “how to help these people learn 
to handle Anglo life and culture effectively.”43  
In 1962, the intercultural approach to the integration of DPS students was 
dealt a serious blow when the United States Supreme Court struck down a 
New York school district’s decision to allow “nonsectarian” prayer in its 
schools.44  Although the decision specifically threatened the nominally 
related issue of religious plurality in the Denver Public Schools, it also 
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symbolized a great deal of skepticism about the intercultural approach to 
integration.  For example, one participant in a cultural workshop vividly 
complained: “[t]o concentrate upon the Spanish community per se is to pose 
the problem as being only one-sided, and indeed may unreasonably 
inculcate a general feeling of inferiority by undue emphasis of the 
assumption that the culture is less desirable and therefore subject to 
investigation.”45 Though proponents of cultural pluralism anticipated many 
of the sociological arguments that would be made in relation to school 
desegregation litigation,46 its application contributed to a negative 
perception of Mexican Americans in Denver’s public schools as well as in 
the larger community.47        
By the mid-1960s, little remained in the DPS’s general curriculum 
regarding the culture, history, and contributions of Denver’s largest and 
most visible minority groups because of a lack of institutional and 
community support.  Instead, as part II shows, growing numbers of black 
students in the city and their movement across previously impenetrable 
neighborhood boundaries forced school administrators and educators to 
revisit the meaning of integration.  Ironically, in a school district that 
previously attempted to integrate its students through intercultural 
exchange, Denver witnessed an alarming rise in the number of racially 
segregated and by legal definition, unequal and inferior schools.   
II.  BOUNDARIES AND BORDERS: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND 
NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS 
On a warm September afternoon in 1956, several thousand people filled 
the Denver Auditorium beyond its capacity.  Many, if not all, of the people 
in the audience were delegates to the annual national convention of the 
National Baptist Church held in Denver, and all had come to hear the 
Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. give the keynote address.48  Dr. King’s 
message centered on the convention’s main theme: civil rights and the 
compelling need for integration not only in the South, but throughout the 
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United States.49  The Denver meeting provided Dr. King a perfect 
opportunity to take integration out of its southern setting.  In addressing the 
convention’s participants Dr. King stated that “[t]he cancer of segregation 
cannot be cured by gradualism.  The United States cannot afford to slow up 
the move toward justice.  The very life of this nation and its future position 
in the world affairs depend upon how we dispose of the matter of racial 
integration.”50      
Dr. King’s message held particular resonance for many parents in 
Denver’s black community.  Only a few months earlier, a group of black 
parents had engaged in a heated conflict over “inferior” schools in the heart 
of Denver’s Five Points Neighborhood with the current Superintendent 
Kenneth Oberholtzer and the Denver School Board.51  At the heart of the 
debates to desegregate Denver’s schools was the meaning and maintenance 
of racial borders erected in Denver since World War II.  This section 
accordingly assesses the contradictory ways that Denverites battled both to 
shatter and maintain the color line that had been established around their 
neighborhoods.  The resulting inability of the DPS to achieve a meaningful 
racial balance among African Americans and whites in Denver’s Public 
Schools only worked to polarize racial tensions in the Denver School 
District and larger metropolis.        
The push for racial balance in Denver began in earnest in 1956, when 
African Americans and other parents forced attention to the stark 
differences in the school district’s junior and senior high schools.  
Inequality among Denver’s various public schools had been a point of 
contention between DPS officials and parents since the late 1940s.  In 
response to parents’ concerns about overcrowding, an aging physical plant, 
and the emergence of African Americans as a significant portion of the 
student body, the DPS Board decided to tear down and rebuild a new high 
school located in the heart of Denver’s African American neighborhood in 
the 1950s.52   
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The hopes of African American parents and the promises made by the 
DPS Board, however, were quickly dashed.  Although the new Manual 
High School was the newest high school in Denver, parents and students 
were disappointed when the school opened its doors.53   Parents soon 
discovered that the School Board drew the attendance boundary for the 
school in a manner that reduced racial integration rather than promoted 
integration.54  Just as troubling, the School Board left little money for 
furnishing the school or buying new books.  It had a “weak and watered-
down curriculum, [and had a] large number of probationary teachers.”55  
Moreover, school officials enforced segregation in explicit ways.  
According to one account, the dean of the girls at Manual High “lectured” 
and “belittled” “Caucasian, Spanish, or Japanese girl[s] who [were] friendly 
with a Negro boy . . . [and] on one occasion where the girl resented the 
‘advice,’ [the dean] encouraged the parents to take her to a psychiatrist.”56   
In January 1956, Peter Holme, Assistant Superintendent of the Denver 
Public Schools, made a proposal to redraw the “optional” and “mandatory” 
attendance zones for Manual High School and its respective feeder junior 
high school.57  Though Holme and other DPS officials noted that the 
boundary change was a necessary measure to respond to the demographic 
change in Denver, African American parents and activists believed that the 
policy was designed to contain the movement of the black community.58  As 
a result, African American parents organized to fight the suggested 
boundary change.59  One group charged the DPS administration with 
knowingly segregating Negro and Mexican American students.60  Instead of 
accepting Holme’s plan, these parents asked the DPS Board and the 
administration to extend the mandatory attendance zone of predominately 
African American schools in order to increase their zone’s white student 
population.61   
In addition to the racial imbalance of these schools, a local citizen’s 
committee was also troubled by differences between the educational 
curricula of black and white high schools located in adjacent 
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neighborhoods.62  At the predominately white high school, students could 
take college preparatory classes such as Shakespeare, Modern History, 
Advanced Mathematics, and Latin while students at the largely black high 
school had remedial and vocational options such as Career Home 
Economics, Office Practice, and Photography.63  In the DPS 
administration’s estimation, educational differences in schools were to be 
expected.  According to Superintendent Oberholtzer, curriculum differences 
were “a matter of student choice” because more students from the white 
high school were going to college.64  Such an attitude begged the question 
from one parent: were fewer students considering college at the 
predominantly minority schools because they did not want to further their 
education or because a vocational curriculum, inadequate counseling, and 
poorly trained teachers led to no other result?65      
In spite of the administration’s opposition to curricular change, the 
Denver School Board and DPS officials, including Superintendent 
Oberholtzer, decided to study the attendance proposal submitted by some of 
the African American parents.66  This decision, in turn, raised consternation 
among several white parents in the potentially affected areas.67  In early 
spring, Oberholtzer received a petition from some four hundred residents of 
one white neighborhood warning that its parents would refuse to send their 
children to the African American high school if they were included in the 
school’s boundaries.68   
On June 20, 1956, the School Board met and approved Assistant 
Superintendent Holme’s original recommendations to redraw the attendance 
boundaries that reflected the highly segregated nature of Denver’s 
neighborhoods.69  In response, LeJean Clark, chair of a citizen’s committee 
organized to fight unequal schools in their East Denver neighborhood, 
charged that the School Board and its administration had “a designed plan 
of segregation.”70  Inspired by the language and spirit of Brown, decided 
only two years earlier, Denver parents threatened to sue the School Board 
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and its administration for unconstitutionally maintaining two separate and 
unequal schools.71   
In contrast to the factual situation in Brown and its companion cases, 
discriminatory animus on the part of the DPS Board and its administration 
was hard to define.  Indeed, the DPS often took positions that indicated its 
administrators' ambivalence about the issue of racial segregation.  For 
example, one Denver Urban League and DPS report studied minority 
teacher employment in the DPS from 1946 to 1957.72  The report found that 
“the number of Negro teachers has increased from five in 1946 to seventy-
five regular and eight substitute teachers as of May 1957.  Negroes are now 
teaching in fourteen elementary, two junior high and one senior high school 
in Denver; in 1946 they taught at only one elementary school . . . . The 
number of teachers from other minority groups has also increased.”73  Yet, 
other evidence indicated problems with this policy.  Of the black and other 
minority teachers that the school district hired, almost all were placed in 
schools with predominately minority student bodies.74  Also of concern was 
evidence that many DPS principals “sought the approval of white faculty 
members before they would place a black teacher in a white school.  Some 
[white] property owners . . . were afraid that [black teachers] and their 
families might move” into all-white neighborhoods.75  Such collective data 
led Denver Urban League Director Sebastian Owens to argue that the 
segregation of “Negro teachers give[s] some basis to a community feeling” 
that the DPS used attendance boundaries to mask discriminatory practices.76       
The neighborhood school policy of hiring minority teachers and the 
pedagogy of cultural pluralism obscured the legal culpability of the Denver 
Public Schools, its School Board, and its administration in maintaining 
segregated and unequal schools.77  In fact, no other recently litigated school 
desegregation case presented such seemingly contradictory tendencies on 
the part of a school board and its administration.  Thus, because of the lack 
of an explicit district policy that compelled segregation, lawyers 
representing the Denver chapters of the American Civil Liberties Union 
Our Selma Is Here 85 
VOLUME 3 • ISSUE 1 • 2004 
(ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (NAACP), as well as the Denver Urban League decided to forego a 
legal challenge to bring DPS in compliance with Brown.78  Yet, many 
continued to believe that the DPS Board and its administration improperly 
took race into account when making its decisions.  As NAACP lawyer Sam 
Menin noted, “[t]his is a subtle type of discrimination that is difficult to put 
your finger on, but we know it exists.”79   
The DPS policies through the first half of the 1960s, especially in regard 
to school boundaries and the maintenance of neighborhood schools, further 
divided Denverites.80  The Denver School Board, however, repeatedly 
affirmed that the racial identity of local students played no part in its 
decisions.81  Instead, DPS administrators and officials argued that a school’s 
student body should be strictly anchored to the neighborhoods of which 
they were a part.  According to one school board member, “[w]e don’t keep 
track by race.  We put schools where the children are . . . . If we have ghetto 
schools it’s because we have ghettos.  The basic answer to this problem is 
the dispersion of the Negro population . . . the school board is not 
responsible for neighborhood housing patterns, you are.”82  In the minds of 
many DPS Board members, the legal mandates of Brown compelled such a 
colorblind approach.83      
However, continued pressure, including a threatened boycott by African 
American parents and other concerned civic groups, compelled the School 
Board to appoint a Special Study Committee on Equality of Education 
Opportunity (Study Committee) in 1962.84  Two years later, the Study 
Committee found that the School Board’s actions contributed to 
segregation, even though there was no official policy to segregate Denver’s 
students.85  Taken together, the Denver Public Schools contained clusters of 
minority racial (“Negro”) and ethnic (“Spanish-surnamed”) groups within 
the city that made unavailable to these children “the democratic experience 
of education with members of other race[s] and groups with which they will 
have to live and compete.”86  
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In spite of the report’s attempt to distinguish Denver’s largest minority 
groups on the basis of race and ethnicity, it nonetheless found that 
concentrations of specifically black and Mexican Americans in a 
neighborhood school system only perpetuated the poor scholastic 
achievements of minority students.87  As a result, the Study Committee 
concluded that Denver’s minority groups would “never be able to compete 
and succeed in accordance with the standards of the dominant urban middle 
class culture” if the DPS adhered to the status quo.88   
In response to the Study Committee’s report, the DPS adopted a change, 
but not a repudiation of the neighborhood school concept.89  The 
administration “recognized that all children within the School District, 
regardless of racial or ethnic background, are equally entitled to the benefits 
of good education and that to secure such benefits the needs and aspirations 
of all children must be considered” to combat “barriers of prejudice, 
discrimination, and ignorance.”90  Although the DPS administration argued 
that it did not intend to abandon the “neighborhood school principle,” it 
hoped to incorporate “changes or adaptations which would result in a more 
diverse or heterogeneous racial and ethnic school population, for both 
pupils and school employees.91  The School Board thus committed the 
Denver Public Schools in theory, if not in practice, to addressing racial 
segregation in its schools.92   
In spite of such actions, however, the DPS Board and its administration 
continued to keep the district’s black and Mexican American students 
concentrated in certain schools.  While DPS bused white students into the 
city’s and the school district’s newly annexed areas in southeast and 
southwest Denver to alleviate school overcrowding, the administration 
utilized mobile and temporary classroom units to respond to overcrowding 
in black and Mexican American schools.93  In such schools, parents and 
activists derogatorily referred to these mobile units as “Oberholtzer 
Wagons.”94 
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To many, it was becoming clear that DPS needed to respond more 
actively to the concentration of black and Mexican American students.95  
The choices, however, were not popular.  As one news article declared, 
DPS could educate students in segregated classrooms or it could achieve 
racial balance by busing.96  The article stated that many Denver parents, 
especially the city’s whites, found busing repugnant.97  However, the failure 
to achieve racial balance in Denver’s schools led minority parents to 
demonstrate at school board meetings and to again threaten a lawsuit 
against the school district.98  The Denver School Board “caught between 
two strong arguments . . . favored study rather than action.  They wanted to 
put the whole question into the hands of a committee to be composed in 
large part of minority group persons.”99  To appease both sides, in 1966, the 
DPS ordered limited busing for a few select schools and commissioned 
another taskforce to study the feasibility of maintaining neighborhood 
schools in the face of widespread residential segregation.100 
The Advisory Council on Equality of Educational Opportunity (Advisory 
Council) was comprised of thirty citizens selected from all facets of the 
Denver community.101  Membership was designed to represent the 
complexity of minority interests and social identities in the Denver area. 102 
Perhaps the biggest obstacle faced by the Advisory Council was the 
“practical considerations involved in efforts to eliminate inequalities of 
educational opportunity” in a diverse, yet segregated community.103  
Given the highly divisive and emotional nature of the desegregation 
debate, the Advisory Council’s final report thus attempted to appease all 
sides. The report of the council first reaffirmed the practicality of 
neighborhood schools, but recognized that racial and ethnic disparity 
existed in the school system.104  The Advisory Council argued that “due 
consideration must be given to certain basic legal principles and decisions 
enunciated by” the nation’s federal courts.105  Indeed, the Advisory Council 
pointed out that “the question now confronting all school boards where such 
racially imbalanced schools exist in fact is whether there is an affirmative 
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duty to integrate and to correct racial imbalances.  So far, the United States 
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on this . . . question.”106   
Although the Advisory Council found that jurisprudence and statutory 
precedent suggested a legal duty to respond to de facto segregation, they 
nevertheless argued that the Colorado Constitution required “the State, its 
agencies and political subdivisions to be color-blind rather than color-
conscious.”107  In “view of the above-stated conflicting legal and 
constitutional principles,” the Advisory Council made several 
recommendations “to evolve feasible methods of achieving integration and 
quality education without violating fundamental legal and constitutional 
doctrines.”108  Consequently, the Advisory Council recommended voluntary 
busing, intensive compensatory education in black and Mexican American 
schools, the creation of an educational park in a neighborhood straddling 
one black and white community, and the establishment of a Cultural Arts 
Center where all students (one-half day a week) would learn about “the 
cultural contributions by various ethnic components of our region, including 
European, Negro, Hispanic, American Indian of the Southwest and Plains 
regions, [and] other ethnic groups.”109   
The Advisory Council’s report called for broad-based programs including 
voluntary integration, continued use of neighborhood schools, and even 
revived the idea of cultural pluralism in the curriculum.110  Nevertheless, the 
recommendations were harshly criticized.111  Indeed, Advisory Council 
member Stephen Knight expressed a scathing critique of the Advisory 
Council’s recommendations in a Minority Report to the larger council’s 
recommendations.112  The Minority Report articulated a fear that Denver 
schools would be used as a “forced instrument of integration” and 
consequently, would not alleviate the housing, employment, government, 
social, and economic problems of the city’s largest minority groups.113  To 
further distinguish the multiracial nature of the issue, the Minority Report 
argued that insufficient attention had been paid to the city’s white majority, 
who, at a personal sacrifice, moved into areas on the basis of neighborhood 
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schools.114  The Minority Report warned that if the neighborhood-school 
concept was undermined through the adoption of the Advisory Council’s 
recommendations, “mainly [w]hite, middle-income” Denverites would 
leave the city and be replaced by the “in-migration of low-skill, low 
income, multi-problem families.”115  Although the Minority Report did not 
mention the race or ethnicity of such supposed problem families, its tone 
nevertheless suggested a degree of racial polarization over Denver’s attempt 
to achieve equality of educational opportunity.       
Despite the Minority Report’s scathing review, later in November 1967, 
Denver citizens voted on a bond issue to implement the Advisory Council’s 
recommendations.116  However, for the first time since 1938, Denverites, by 
a margin of three to one, failed to endorse a school bond issue.117  
Notwithstanding the bond vote setback, two DPS Board members 
introduced Resolution 1490 to the School Board on April 25, 1968.  The 
resolution served as a response to the reality that the “continuation of 
neighborhood schools has resulted in the concentration of some minority 
racial and ethnic groups”118 and required the DPS superintendent to prepare 
a comprehensive integration plan for the DPS system by September 1968.119  
After a month of acrimonious debate, the DPS Board, by a margin of five to 
two, voted to adopt the resolution.  The School Board then asked DPS’s 
new superintendent, Dr. Robert Gilberts, to devise a plan to implement the 
School Board’s integration policy.120   
One of the members voting against the resolution, Stephen Knight, author 
of the Minority Report, again voiced his opposition to forced integration.121  
According to Knight, the DPS Board had been overly influenced by the 
“pressures of a small group of misdirected people” and its actions were 
“contrary to the wishes” of Denver’s white majority.122  Despite vocal and 
strident opposition, Superintendent Gilberts’s desegregation plan was 
enacted through a series of resolutions between January and April of 
1969.123  Shortly after the School Board passed the first of the three 
resolutions, one angry parent declared: “[a]s of last Monday (the day the 
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school board began discussing the integration resolution), the value of my 
home decreased 10 percent.”124  Other parents suggested that they would 
move away from Denver rather than be bullied by integrationist beatniks 
and hippies whom they believed had appropriated the School Board.125   
As such sentiments made clear, school integration signified the extent 
that racial tension polarized Denver during the 1960s.  While the issue 
appeared split between black and white lines, many Chicano Denverites, the 
city’s largest minority group, had their own ideas about neighborhood 
schools and integration.    
III.  THE CHICANO/A RESPONSE TO INTEGRATION 
Seemingly lost in Denver’s integration debates was the role that the city’s 
Chicanos would play in both policies.  While Mexican Americans were 
collectively Denver’s largest and most impoverished minority group, they 
did not easily fit into the racial politics of school desegregation and 
metropolitan growth.126  As a result, the desegregation debate emerged in 
public discourse as a black and white issue.  However, the DPS’s Advisory 
Council reports made clear that Mexican American students were 
increasingly concentrated in many substandard Denver schools.127  As 
Rodolfo Gonzales’s interruption of the DPS Board meeting in 1968 
demonstrated, the convergence of interests among the city’s non-white 
groups was not as seamless as many assumed.128  While Chicano activists, 
parents, and students knew well the consequences of discrimination and 
racial inequality, many were highly skeptical about racial balance and 
busing as a solution.129   
As a result, Denver’s Chicano community articulated a fundamentally 
different understanding and definition of integration in comparison to the 
general understanding of the term in the black community.  This section 
accordingly analyzes a series of school walkouts by Denver’s Chicano 
students in 1969 to demonstrate a Mexican American vision of equal 
education.  Rather than working to achieve racial balance in the numbers of 
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minority and non-minority students in Denver schools, Chicanos in the 
Denver metropolitan area attempted to achieve integration and equality by 
forcing the school district to come to grips with the unique needs and 
concerns of Mexican American students.    
On February 27, 1969, concerned parents, students, and Chicano 
activists, including Rodolfo Gonzales and school board member A. Edgar 
Benton, met with West High School administrators over concerns that 
social studies teacher Harry B. Shafer allegedly made racist and bigoted 
remarks to Chicano students.130  At the meeting, Chicano students and 
parents confronted Shafer about allegations that he had said, “If you eat 
Mexican food you’ll get stupid and even look like a Mexican . . . Hispanos 
are stupid because their parents are stupid and their parents were stupid.”131  
At the meeting Shafer explained that “he had made the statements but only 
in an attempt to prompt debate, not as an insult.”132  Despite pleas by 
Chicano parents and activists that Shafer be immediately dismissed for his 
actions, school officials instead ordered an investigation into the teacher’s 
conduct.133  A few days later, Shafer argued that he had been subjected to a 
kangaroo court when he filed a grievance with the Denver Classroom 
Teachers Association in order to protect his interests.134   
Not long after this meeting, Superintendent Gilberts became involved.135  
After interviewing students, parents, and teachers for a week, Gilberts 
declared that Shafer’s actions were not motivated by bias, bigotry, or 
discrimination.136  In a letter to Shafer and West High School’s 
administration, Gilberts declared:  “It is our judgment that these charges 
have not been substantiated and do not seem to reflect either Mr. Shafer’s 
philosophy or conduct.”137  Despite being exonerated, Shafer, in a meeting 
with Gilberts on March 19, asked to be transferred to another school.138  
Angered by the result of Gilberts’s findings, Chicano students presented a 
list of demands to West High School’s administration and stated that they 
would walk out of classes if their demands were not met.139   
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 The demands made by Chicano students signified the extent to which 
they viewed Shafer’s conduct as something more systemic than individual 
bigotry and bias.  The students asked not only for Shafer’s resignation, but 
they also pressed the DPS administration to place Mexican Americans at the 
center of its efforts to eliminate prejudice and bigotry in Denver’s public 
schools.140  The students demanded the implementation of Chicano culture 
and history classes and bilingual education programs from kindergarten 
through high school, the creation of a West High Neighborhood School 
Board, and a dramatic reduction in class sizes.141  The ultimate goal was to 
encourage a reorientation of the curriculum and school structure to 
emphasize varying perspectives.142   
On March 20, 1969, Chicano students began to walk out of their classes 
after DPS officials failed to respond to their demands.143  The students, 
along with community supporters, held a rally in a park across the street.144  
Rodolfo Gonzales, in a speech, echoed the demonstrators theme: “The 
young people demand an equal education, and they’re going to get it.  These 
teachers will have to start listening to the demands of our youth.”145  After 
speeches from several student leaders and Chicano activists, the 
demonstrators marched to nearby Baker Junior High School where others 
joined in support.146  When the demonstrators continued their march back to 
West High School, the student protesters and Chicano activists encountered 
several units of the Denver Police Department.147   
Once the demonstrators began marching up the front steps of West High 
School, Denver Police “holding riot sticks across their chests . . . started 
moving the crowd [and] . . . several small struggles broke out.  Suddenly, 
according to witnesses, the air was full of rocks and pop bottles.”148  The 
Denver Police acted on the authority given to them in a recently legislated 
Colorado campus disorder law and used mace and physical force to subdue 
the crowd.149  At least twenty six people were arrested, two were 
hospitalized, and several others were injured in the violent confrontation 
between students, activists, and the police.150  Afterward, the demonstrators 
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regrouped, their ranks bolstered by members of the Students for Democratic 
Society (SDS) from the University of Colorado at Boulder, and protested at 
City Hall and Denver police headquarters.151   
The next day, the events of the previous day were repeated.  An estimated 
1,200 to 1,500 student demonstrators and political activists again 
congregated at the school and rallied against unequal education and racial 
discrimination at West High School.152  One placard held by a demonstrator 
boldly declared: “Our Selma Is Here.”153  However, Denver’s “Selma” 
reflected a racial complexity and racial coalition that did not exist in efforts 
to desegregate southern public schools.  As the West High School 
demonstrators supported Chicano studies and bilingual education, many 
Denver students believed that the culprit preventing true integration was the 
educational policy that distinguished and segregated the city’s Chicano and 
black students from their white peers.   
Consequently, black students from Denver’s East and Manual High 
Schools marched from their schools to West High School in support of the 
Chicano student demands.154   One newspaper, with pictures of large groups 
of black and Chicano students marching together, reported on the 
multiracial dynamic in the struggle for educational equality in the city.155  
According to the Denver Post, “[A]s helmeted officers wearing gas mask 
containers and carrying riot sticks stood by, local Black Panther leader 
Lauren Watson, told the crowd ‘this is a day of black and brown unity.’”156 
The action of Chicano and black students and activists suggested that 
integration in Denver needed to be understood in multiracial terms.  One 
student from East High School echoed the newly reoriented racial identities 
that were at the heart of Denver’s school desegregation and integration 
debate: “Black and white together is a bunch of bull . . . . We’re going to 
sing black and brown together.”157      
Similar to the struggle of black parents and students attempting to 
achieve equality in their schools,158 the demands of Chicano students were 
dismissed as the belligerent actions of a small minority.  Indeed, the Rocky 
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Mountain News, in an editorial condemning the violence, made the 
following accusatory remarks: “NOBODY—MOST OF ALL the students 
recruited into the demonstrations—seemed sure of what the rock throwing, 
police-taunting fracas was all about . . . . This outburst was promoted by 
people long past the high school age.”159  Despite the perceived sense of 
unity among Denver’s black and brown students, the “West High 
Blowouts”—as Chicano activists came to call the events—symbolized the 
complex struggle for equality of educational opportunity and subsequent 
multiracial fractures in Denver.  One news report, for instance, noted that at 
one point during the demonstrations, blacks and Chicanos argued about the 
focus of the protest.160     
Significantly, the discontent of the students did not just suddenly emerge.  
As State Senator Roger Cisneros, of Denver, told the Denver Public School 
Board, “The demands and aspirations are not the demands of a few 
militants—but the demands of the entire Hispano community.  The 
dramatization last Thursday . . . said all the things we’ve been saying for the 
past four or five years.  But no one has been listening.”161  Integrationist 
Denver Board of Education member A. Edgar Benton “was distressed that 
some of the most influential Denverites he had been talking to about last 
week’s violence at West seemed to feel the key issue was ‘how to get rid of 
Corky Gonzales.’”162  Benton pointed out that “this viewpoint is patently 
absurd on its face.  Corky Gonzales is irrelevant to the problem at West 
High School.”163  Instead, Benton implicated racial attitudes that permeated 
throughout the city.  He stated that “[t]he problem is in southeast Denver, 
and East Denver, and other parts of the community wherever people 
continue to rest on a lot of wrong assumptions about Mexican Americans.  
One of those assumptions is that ‘the Mexican isn’t worth a damn and there 
isn’t much that can be done about him.’”164  Benton articulated the reality 
that in multiracial Denver, equality of education would not be accomplished 
by any one means.165 
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In the weeks and months that followed, DPS Superintendent Gilberts 
answered the students’ demands.  He promised to expand the teaching of 
Chicano history, culture and language at West High School and other 
Denver public schools; increase the Chicano studies collection in West’s 
library; enlarge present elementary school foreign language programs; work 
with parents, students, teachers, and activists to get each into a dialogue 
regarding “the social and economic problems of the community surrounding 
West High School”; serve Mexican food in the lunchroom; and continue 
efforts to increase the number of Chicano teachers in the DPS.166  Although 
Gilberts did not accede to all of the demands of Chicano youth, Rodolfo 
Gonzales called the proposal “the greatest victory in the history of 
Denver.”167  Moreover, later that summer, state legislators repealed a law 
that banned teaching in any language other than English and enacted 
another law providing for comprehensive bilingual and bicultural education 
in the state’s public schools.168   
There were, however, other developments that suggested a dramatic 
retreat from efforts to provide educational equality in the Denver public 
school system.  In the spring of 1969, lawyer James Perrill and former state 
senator and realtor Frank Southworth campaigned for two open seats on the 
Denver School Board.169  One of the open seats belonged to integrationist 
Benton.170  Perrill and Southworth exclusively campaigned on the premise 
that Denver’s schools should not attempt to correct “all of the social ills of 
the society,” promising to end the current Board’s policy of forced busing 
and to repeal the integration resolutions if they were elected.171  In 
commenting on the creative redundancy of Perrill and Southworth’s 
message, one national observer stated that “[i]n their public appearances, 
Perrill and Southworth mentioned crosstown busing, massive busing, and 
massive crosstown busing.  By the end of the campaign, Southworth was 
talking about ‘forced mandatory crosstown busing on a massive scale.’”172   
The strategy worked.  In May of 1969, Perrill and Southworth won in a 
landslide victory.173  Importantly, Perrill and Southworth’s opponents “lost 
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soundly in the Anglo sections of Denver.  They even lost the white areas 
that would not have been touched by the busing plan.”174  Consequently, 
Perrill and Southworth spearheaded the rescission of the integration 
resolutions at the meeting of the new board on June 9, 1969.175  As a result, 
the newly constituted anti-busing board enacted Resolution 1533 and 
reinstated the previous voluntary open enrollment plan of the Denver Public 
Schools.176  Ten days later, on June 19, 1969, a group of black, Hispano, 
and white parents and their children filed suit against the Denver Public 
School Board and its administration in the United States District Court, 
Colorado, for maintaining a policy of intentional segregation of the 
district’s diverse student body.177   
Less than a week after Chicano students at West High School became 
involved in violent confrontations with the Denver Police Department and 
within months of the newly reconstituted DPS Board’s decision to rescind 
its integration policies, Dwight D. Eisenhower passed away.178  For many, it 
was the end of a seemingly simpler, nobler, and purer time in American 
society.179  For others, however, it was the continuation of a culture of 
racism and discrimination that had barely changed since the Supreme 
Court’s apparent rejection of such thinking in Brown v. Board of Education 
in 1954.180  Tellingly, the Denver Post’s editorial tribute to Eisenhower was 
surrounded by editorial reactions to the “racial confrontation” at West High 
School and racial segregation in American society.181  According to one of 
the accounts, “five years ago a demonstration the size of the one at West 
would have been inconceivable for the Denver area . . . . Why the change?  
Because the Denver area leaders have chosen to attack isolated problems . . 
. rather than concentrate on basic issues of human dignity.”182  Indeed, only 
twelve years removed from President Eisenhower’s reluctant decision to use 
the National Guard to enforce a federal court’s order to integrate a high 
school in Little Rock, Arkansas,183 the Denver Public School Board openly 
rejected the “human dignity” aspirations behind the effort to provide equal 
education in the city’s schools.  In the aftermath of Perrill’s and 
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Southworth’s elections, one Denverite noted that “[a]s a black citizen, I’m 
not so sure South Denver does not really look like Little Rock.”184   
In contrast to school desegregation in the American South, the terms, 
conditions, and meaning of integration were dramatically different in this 
western city.  The Denver Public School District attempted to balance the 
concerns of all of these groups by a variety of means. The philosophy of 
cultural pluralism, the adherence to a policy of neighborhood schools, and 
grudging acknowledgment of racial imbalance all amounted to the inability 
of the DPS to come to grips with racial inequality in its schools.  Given 
such contradictory policies, racial discrimination in Denver’s public schools 
seemed too disconnected and disparate for many in the Denver community.  
Moreover, the multiple, and at times conflicting, positions of Denver’s 
black, Chicano, and white communities in how Denver schools should 
implement integration only obscured many of the core issues.  
The Denver Public School Board’s ambivalence regarding these issues 
put into sharp relief the importance of racial difference and antagonism in 
Denver.  For African Americans and Mexican Americans, in particular, the 
DPS Board’s vote to reverse its position on integration further reinforced 
Mexican and African Americans’ belief that they were not full and equal 
metropolitan citizens.  In response, one integration activist declared, “We’re 
going to probe, lobby, protest, embarrass, enjoin, and whatever else is 
legally available to accomplish our aims.”185  The Keyes complaint 
represented the centerpiece of such an endeavor.  For many, this litigation 
against the Denver School Board served as a litmus test to spell out clearly 
and define what equality, fairness, and justice meant for black, Chicano, and 
white parents and students.      
IV.  RACE MAKING, EQUALITY JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE 
DESEGREGATION OF AMERICAN SCHOOLS 
On July 16, 1969, Judge William Doyle of the United States District 
Court, Colorado, held the first of many hearings in Keyes v. School District 
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Number One.186  Of the 96,000 students who attended Denver’s public 
schools, 66 percent were Anglo, 20 percent Hispano, and 14 percent 
Black.187  Despite being the smallest minority group in the school system, 
black parents and activists, mobilized by nearly a decade of adverse school 
board decisions, took the lead in pursuing litigation after the School Board 
voted to rescind its integration policies.188  Accordingly, the complaint 
asked the court to consider whether the “use of various techniques such as 
the manipulation of student attendance zones, school site selection, and a 
neighborhood school policy, created or maintained racially or ethnically (or 
both racially and ethnically) segregated schools throughout the school 
district, entitling the plaintiffs to a decree directing desegregation of the 
entire school district.”189 
Over the following six-day hearing, Judge Doyle considered the 
plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin the School Board from rescinding the School 
District’s integration plan.190  In his written opinion, Judge Doyle made it 
clear that in “any case involving discrimination in public schools,” the 
Constitution’s equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
“designed to protect fundamental rights, not only of the majority but of 
minorities as well, even against the will of the majority.  The effort to 
accommodate community sentiment or the wishes of the majority of voters . 
. . cannot justify abandonment of our Constitution.”191  
The issues in the case, however, very quickly revealed the problems of 
applying the Constitution to populations where the question of “majority” 
and “minority” were not so clear.  Although federal courts had long 
recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment was not subject to a “two-class” 
theory of protection, there was little jurisprudence in 1969 that spoke to the 
ways in which the law balanced the varied and often competing interests of 
a multiracial population.192  As Harvard Professor Christopher Jencks 
remarked at the time, “Denver will have to redraw its zones in such a way 
as to offset the effects of neighborhood segregation and produce racially 
mixed schools.”193  
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However, courts were confronted with the question of what the meaning 
of “racially mixed” legally entailed in a city not split between black and 
white lines.  In answering this question, Justice Brennan of the United 
States Supreme Court in 1973 summarized the legal dilemma facing the 
federal courts, “Denver is tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial 
community. . . . [Thus,] [s]hould Negroes and Hispanos . . . be placed in the 
same category to establish the segregated character of a school?”194 The 
resolution of this question and the subsequent application of a desegregation 
remedy to the Denver Public School system highlighted the challenges of 
integrating a tri-ethnic student body.  
A.  Multiracial Categories and American Law: A Brief Overview 
Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, American courts 
encountered great difficulties incorporating non-white and non-black groups 
into American law.195  As Ian Haney-López demonstrated, the most 
extended legal and jurisprudential discussion regarding the racial positions 
of these groups occurred in relation to naturalization prerequisite cases.196  
Of the fifty-one cases decided by federal courts between 1878 and 1952, a 
majority took place in jurisdictions in the American West and involved the 
racial status of Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiians, Burmese, Mexicans, Native 
Americans, Asian Indians, Syrians, Armenians, Filipinos, Punjabis, and 
Afghanis.197  In these cases, courts used common knowledge, contemporary 
science, congressional intent, and legal precedent to find each of these 
groups non-white and, in turn, to deny most of these petitioners’ 
naturalization claims.198   
However, one of the few exceptions involved the claim of a “pure-
blooded Mexican” in 1897.199  In In re Rodriguez, the federal district court 
in Texas allowed a Mexican petitioner to become a citizen, although “if 
strict scientific classification of the anthropologist . . . [were] adopted, he 
would probably not be classed as [W]hite.”200  Over thirty years later, the 
United States Supreme Court contributed to further confusion by declaring 
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that “[w]hether a person of [Mexican] descent may be naturalized in the 
United States is still an unsettled question.”201   
Rather than clarify any ambiguity regarding the meaning of “whiteness” 
in such jurisprudence, courts instead assumed the whiteness and blackness 
of various groups.  For example, in Gong Lum v. Rice in 1927, the Supreme 
Court did not question the state of Mississippi’s decision to classify a 
“Chinese citizen of the United States . . . among the colored races.”202  
Although the Gong Lum opinion specifically indicated that a “white, brown, 
yellow, or black” racial typography existed, it did not provide any hard-and-
fast constitutional rules for determining multiracial rights.203  Instead, the 
Supreme Court reinforced the “colored” and “non-colored” distinction 
found in Mississippi’s state law.204  As in the naturalization cases, however, 
the racial status of Mexican Americans proved troublesome for the nation’s 
racial constitutional jurisprudence.   
By the late nineteenth century, Mexican American litigants, in particular, 
found themselves arguing two related types of constitutional issues that 
were also common among African Americans: the exclusion of Mexican 
Americans from juries; and the segregation of Mexican Americans in jury 
pools, public schools, and public accommodations.205  By the early 
twentieth century, however, the racial status of Mexican Americans in 
constitutional cases rejected any similarities to the nation’s black 
community.206  
 In Texas, for example, Clare Sheridan has shown that prior to the 1950s, 
state courts repeatedly held that “Mexicans were part of the white race, and, 
therefore, as whites, they were not discriminated against when juries were 
constituted solely of whites.”207  Although Mexican Americans were 
socially and politically treated as non-white in places like California and 
Texas, courts maintained the fiction that they were white in the eyes of the 
law.208   
Such cases were based on two arguments.  First, state courts throughout 
the American West continued to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
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based on a two-class theory of race that applied only to white discrimination 
against non-whites.209  In 1937, the Colorado Supreme Court followed this 
rationale by holding that a “White Trade Only” sign hung on the outside of 
a quasi-public pool did not apply to plaintiffs of Spanish descent.210  
According to the Supreme Court of Colorado, the sign, even “in its [most] 
offensive sense, was without application to [the Spanish] petitioners.”211  
However, despite evidence that the pool’s proprietors discriminated against 
“Spanish Americans,” the court refused to hear their claim.212   
The second argument assumed that even if Mexican Americans were 
discriminated against, they as a group were a nationality subject to a lower 
degree of constitutional protection.213  In this line of reasoning, “‘nationality 
groups’ did not carry the same constitutional meaning as racial groups . . . 
and because Mexicans were a nationality group, the equal protection clause 
did not apply to them.”214  Although the Supreme Court suggested in Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins in 1887 that race and nationality were on equal footing, the 
whiteness and non-Americaness of Mexican Americans prevented them 
from being successful in many of their Fourteenth Amendment claims.215      
In some cases, the whiteness of Mexican Americans proved an asset.  For 
instance, the first court-ordered school desegregation case in the United 
States involved Mexican Americans in the multiracial West.216  In 1931, a 
county court in California evaluated the decision of a local school board to 
build a Mexican school based on state law that permitted the segregation of 
African and American Indian students.217  The county court held that 
Mexican Americans did not fall under the rubric of either of these racial 
designations and as a result, invalidated the school board’s decision.218  In 
other cases, however, the two-class and nationality theories of 
discrimination, especially in Texas, allowed courts to consistently uphold 
the segregation of Mexican Americans from other whites.219  In such cases, 
courts held that migrant work patterns, English-language deficiencies, and 
the need to “Americanize” Mexican students justified segregation.220   
102 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
FROM BROWN TO GRUTTER: RACIAL INTEGRATION AND THE LAW 
In 1947 and 1954, two cases disrupted the racial and nationality 
limitations applied to Mexican Americans in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence.  The first was when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
Westminster School District of Orange County v. Mendez, upheld the 
decision of a California federal district court to invalidate one school 
district’s policy to segregate Mexican students.221  Although both the trial 
court and the appellate court noted that none of the parties to the case made 
a claim of racial discrimination, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless briefly 
assessed the racial dynamics of the case.222  The Ninth Circuit noted that all 
school segregation jurisprudence written by state and federal courts 
included “only children of parents belonging to one or another of the great 
races of mankind.”223  To further elaborate what these races were, the court 
stated the following: 
Somewhat empirically, it used to be taught that mankind was made 
up of white, brown, yellow, black and red men.  Such divisional 
designation has little or no adherents among anthropologists or 
ethnic scientists.  A more scholarly nomenclature is Caucasoid, 
Mongoloid, and Negroid, yet this is unsatisfactory, as an attempt to 
collectively sort all mankind into distinct [racial] groups.224 
The court’s inability to arrive at a satisfactory definition of race indicated 
the racial ambiguity of the Mexican American litigants in the case.  Indeed, 
the court’s unwillingness to defer to scholarly nomenclature suggested that 
the Ninth Circuit may have considered Mexicans as their own specific racial 
group.   
The Ninth Circuit, however, never had to address this issue because 
California law already specifically distinguished separate Indian, Chinese, 
Japanese, and Mongolian schools.225  Thus, because the Mexican American 
students did not belong to any of these groups, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the school board’s segregation policies were arbitrarily applied and, thus, 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.226  While neither the Ninth Circuit, nor 
the parties to the case settled the issue of the racial status of Mexican 
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Americans, the Mendez decision made it clear that Mexcian Americans 
could not be lumped together with these non-white groups.227   
In the second case occurring in 1954, the United States Supreme Court, 
in Hernández v. Texas, addressed the long-standing exclusion of Mexican 
Americans from juries in Texas.228 The Court rejected arguments that had 
been historically used by Texas courts to deny “Mexican Americans” 
constitutional protections.229 According to the decision’s architect, Chief 
Justice Earl Warren, “The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely 
against discrimination due to a ‘two-class theory’—that is, based upon 
differences between ‘white’ and Negro.”230  Instead, Warren argued that 
“community prejudices are not static, and from time to time other 
differences from the community norm may define other groups which need 
the same protection.  Whether such a group exists within a community is a 
question of fact.”231  In asking whether a Fourteenth Amendment violation 
had been committed, the Supreme Court seemingly suggested that the 
relevant inquiry was not whether Mexicans were a racial nationality group, 
but whether Mexicans were part of a class that had been arbitrarily denied 
constitutional rights.232  Although Justice Warren declined to address 
explicitly the racial and national implications of the decision, Hernández’s 
own lawyers saw Mexican Americans as “another white race” that merited 
Fourteenth Amendment protection.233   
Importantly, 1954 was also the year that the United States Supreme Court 
wrote its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education.234  As the named case of 
four consolidated cases, Brown’s fact patterns in Kansas took place on the 
periphery of the multiracial American West.  Yet, the region’s racial 
diversity played no role in its disposition.  Indeed, neither the parties, nor 
the amici, nor the authors in Brown cited Mexican American school 
desegregation in the American West at any stage in the case, even though 
the Supreme Court decided Brown a mere twelve days after it decided 
Hernández.235   
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Despite the failure to connect racial school segregation and 
discriminatory jury selection in the “multi-class” West, the Court’s 1954 
Hernández and Brown cases nevertheless indicated the inability of the 
Supreme Court to imagine a multiracial United States.  As one study noted, 
“the Court was considering the issues of Latino [racial identity] and of 
school desegregation concurrently.  Because the Court carefully dodged the 
question of Latinos’ racial identity in Hernández . . . it is not surprising that 
the Court did not address the question of Latino school segregation in 
Brown.  After all, Brown occurred within the familiar black-white 
binary.”236  In this binary, the constitutional presumption was that Mexican 
Americans were white, even if they were “another white race.”  
Although the color line played very different roles in Brown and 
Hernández, each case highlighted the centrality as well as the ambiguity of 
race in constitutional jurisprudence.  The American West’s Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence demonstrated that legal and social distinctions 
and categories were not static but were subject to rapid change and 
contradiction.  Ironically, however, jurisprudence, particularly the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence that commented on the rights of non-white and non-
black groups, only reinforced the binary of race and color in constitutional 
law, rather than disrupting it.  Indeed, it would be over a decade before non-
black groups, including Mexican Americans and Asian Americans and 
Pacific Islanders in the American West, utilized the presumptions of racial 
inferiority established in Brown to challenge segregation of these same 
groups.237  In such litigation, Mexican American activists, no longer argued 
that they were another white race.238  On the other hand, as the battle to 
integrate Denver’s schools demonstrated, Mexican Americans did not view 
themselves as another black race.239  At the time that Keyes was filed, courts 
and other governmental institutions were only beginning to consider the 
meaning of race in a multi-class environment.240  While constitutional 
jurisprudence indicated a color spectrum between whites and blacks, it did 
not anticipate many of the problems that would arise when the facts of the 
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case did not fit racial preconceptions and prescriptions forged in a racially 
binary legal world.      
B.  The Legal Boundaries of Inequality and Chicano/a Identity   
At the time that the black, Chicano, and white students filed their case in 
Denver in 1969, there were no reported school desegregation cases that 
specifically involved representatives from all three groups.  Nevertheless, 
the complaint argued that “Negro and Hispano children residing in the 
School District” were not receiving the same “educational opportunities, 
advantages, and facilities afforded and available to Anglo children of public 
school age similarly situated in the School District.”241  Although the 
plaintiffs’ complaint left open the question of whether such practices were 
the result of discrimination based on “race, color, or ethnicity,” the 
complaint alleged that the principles of equality in Brown had been 
violated.242  In contrast to Brown, however, the issue of equality in Denver 
literally could not be understood in only black and white terms.  
Accordingly, the complaint asked the court to determine whether the 
policies and practices of the DPS system failed to prepare practically the 
district’s white, black, and Chicano students to live in a multiracial world.243     
Despite the multiracial school system described in the complaint, the 
plaintiffs constructed their argument in a dual-system, “minority/majority” 
framework.244  During the testimony of the preliminary injunction hearing 
in July of 1969 and the trial on the merits in the spring of 1970, the 
plaintiffs posed the constitutional violation as one that had been inflicted by 
a white majority upon the School District’s Chicano and black minorities 
together.245  For this reason, the plaintiffs’ legal team argued for system-
wide integration.246   
As Judge Doyle pointed out, a threshold problem in evaluating a 
constitutional remedy “[was] a definition of segregation.”247  For Judge 
Doyle, segregation did not only revolve around the “heavy concentration of 
a minority group,”248  it also involved the “racial and ethnic composition of 
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faculty and staff, [the] equality of educational opportunity offered at the 
school,” the community attitudes towards the school, and most importantly, 
the explicit acts of a school board and its administration in creating such 
conditions.249   
Outside of the schools in one particular racially concentrated 
neighborhood, the relationship of all of these issues seemed harder to 
connect.  To frame their case in relation to the entire school system, the 
plaintiffs identified “core city” schools that had large concentrations of 
black and /or Chicano students, faculty and staff.250  Rather than describe 
discernable differences among the educational experiences and the 
integration remedies of these minority students, the plaintiffs instead 
introduced evidence that explained how each group, both individually and 
collectively, had been denied the equality of an educational opportunity.251  
Such evidence included reports and studies that concluded Denver’s core-
city black and Chicano schools tended to have: “(1) low average scholastic 
achievement; (2) less experienced teachers; (3) higher rates of teacher 
turnover; (4) higher dropout rates; and (5) older buildings and smaller 
sites.”252   
The discriminatory acts of the School Board and DPS Administration 
regarding these schools, however, were more difficult to prove.  According 
to Superintendent Kenneth Oberholtzer, the conditions at such schools were 
not the result of any explicit or tacit desire of the School Board or the 
administration to discriminate against minority students.253  Rather, 
Oberholtzer argued that poor student achievement at such schools was the 
result of “[a person’s] home environment, his mother and dad, his sisters 
and brothers, [and] the neighborhood in which he grows up and becomes a 
person.”254   
The School District’s desire to explain school desegregation as the 
product of the Chicano and black condition did not carry much weight.  
Instead, Judge Doyle found that the DPS had a policy of willful ignorance 
in relation to such schools.255   Although Judge Doyle pointed out that “the 
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Board’s eye-closing and head-burying” regarding such schools “normally is 
not the kind of conduct” reached by the Fourteenth Amendment 
desegregation jurisprudence,256 he nevertheless decided that the 
Constitution could not ignore the “relationship between racial 
concentration” in Denver’s core-city schools and “inferiority in 
achievement and low standards and consequently low morale” among the 
multiracial students.257  The question remained, however, what did “racial 
concentration” mean in a case involving Hispano, Negro, and Anglo 
students?   
The plaintiffs’ legal team argued that Denver schools were segregated if 
they had large concentrations of Negro and/or Hispano students.258  
Accordingly, counsel for the plaintiffs targeted twenty-five schools that had 
a racial concentration of Chicano and African American students.  While 
some schools had undeniable concentrations of Chicano and African 
American students, the racial concentration of other schools required a more 
complicated analysis.259  The plaintiffs recognized that a minority and 
therefore unequal school in Denver would not appear as segregated if 
Chicano or African American students were counted separately.260  
Moreover, in many such core-city schools, separately counting these 
minority students would give the appearance of an integrated school district 
if the court considered Chicanos to be just another white race.261   
Judge Doyle was not prepared to agree that African American and 
Chicano students should be counted together.262  As Judge Doyle pointed 
out, the plaintiffs’ attempts to “place Hispanos as well as Negroes . . . all in 
one category and [to] utilize the total number as establishing the segregated 
character of the school . . . is often an over-simplification, . . . and [to] lump 
them into a single minority category . . . remains a problem and 
question.”263  Although Judge Doyle, who was influenced by his 
understanding of Denver and its group politics, conceded that African 
American and Chicano people shared economic and cultural deprivation 
and discrimination, he observed that “Hispanos have a wholly different 
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origin, and the problems applicable to them are often different.”264  
Accordingly, the different histories and obstacles of African Americans and 
Chicanos posed problems over what actually constituted a segregated or 
racially imbalanced school.   
Rather than engaging in a long and inconsistent discourse of racial and 
ethnic differences in American constitutional jurisprudence, Judge Doyle 
simply noted that the mission of the federal courts in school desegregation 
cases was to determine the “inequality based upon race or ethnic origin.”265  
Consequently, Judge Doyle’s opinion suggested that there was no need to 
distinguish between racial or ethnic discrimination in terms of school 
desegregation litigation.  Judge Doyle opined that to “the extent that 
Hispanos, as a group, are isolated in concentrated numbers,” such schools 
are “segregated.”266  Thus, Judge Doyle found that a “concentration of 
either African American or Chicano students constituting approximately 70 
to 75 percent of the school’s general population was a school likely to 
produce the kind of inferiority with which the courts were concerned.“267  
Applying this formula to each school, Judge Doyle found that fifteen of 
the twenty-five schools identified by the plaintiffs separately denied African 
American and Chicano students  equal educational opportunity, and as a 
result, these minority-concentrated schools were subject to a school 
desegregation order.268  Judge Doyle ordered these schools to improve their 
faculty, to institute a voluntary transfer policy out of “inferior schools to 
good schools,” to initiate limited busing to integrate the core-city and Park 
Hill schools with minority concentrations, and to offer compensatory 
education, including “human relations training, Spanish training, and 
classes in Negro and Hispano culture and history.”269   
In addition, the court determined that such schools would be integrated 
when each “has an Anglo composition in excess of 50 percent.”270  Judge 
Doyle further outlined his vision for the remaining 50 percent: “Although it 
is probably not constitutionally required, the desirability of having the 
minority student population in each of these schools apportioned equally 
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between Negro and Hispano children is apparent.”271  Despite Judge 
Doyle’s conviction that Chicano and black students could not be counted 
together, he described the so-called “minority factor” that exacerbated the 
problem of racial concentration.272  Judge Doyle noted that “the minority 
citizens are products, in many instances, of parents who received inferior 
educations and hence the home environment, which is looked to for many 
fundamental sources of learning and knowledge, yields virtually no 
educational value.”273  In Judge Doyle’s opinion, the only hope was 
bringing Denver’s Hispano and Negro citizens into contact with 
knowledgeable Anglos.274  
Judge Doyle’s early disposition of the multiple issues in Keyes 
highlighted an already muddled understanding of racial difference in 
American law and jurisprudence.275  Although Judge Doyle did not have a 
body of multiracial understanding in the law at his disposal to use for 
consistency or to justify his decision to apportion rights among the Denver 
School District’s many groups, he was not the only jurist to have such a first 
impression of the multiracial interests at stake.   
In south Texas, for instance, the legal effort to desegregate one urban 
school district demonstrated an emerging awareness of the multiracial 
interests involved in the nation’s constitutional jurisprudence.276  The case 
Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District277 challenged the 
maintenance of a dual school system erected against Mexican American and 
black students in the Corpus Christi Independent School District.278  As a 
result, Cisneros  provided another way that American courts have attempted 
to reconcile race and rights among a racially diverse student body.  On June 
4, 1970, Judge Woodrow Seals issued his opinion.279  The court confronted 
the question of whether Brown and its progeny applied to Mexican 
Americans, and if so, what constituted a segregated school when Negroes 
and Anglos were also involved?280      
Like Judge Doyle’s opinion, Judge Seals’s opinion is not consistent in its 
use of racial and ethnic terminology.  Moreover, Judge Seals argued that 
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such terms were subject to change and redefinition over time and that all 
group identification labels such as Chicano, black, and, even the term 
“ethnic-minority,” were misnomers dependent upon variances in time, 
place, and context.281  In one footnote, Judge Seals explained: “The court 
used the term ‘minority’ simply because the case involves ethnic groups 
that are numerically in the minority.  Nationally, Mexican American and 
Negro populations are decidedly in the minority . . . . The court recognized 
that either group may represent a majority in the United States at some time 
in the future.”282  Because Judge Seals was convinced that racial or ethnic 
misidentification limited the constitutional analysis, he indicated that a 
court needed to closely analyze a city’s history in order to determine if 
various groups, particularly Mexican Americans, were disadvantaged in 
ways that denied them constitutional rights.283  Such evidence revealed that 
in Corpus Christi, as in Denver, racial discrimination did not easily split 
between black and white lines.          
To determine the constitutional remedy for the Mexican American and 
African American students, Judge Seals argued that “the constitutional 
inquiry is concerned with whether a particular disadvantaged group is being 
substantially segregated from the more advantaged group. . . . The 
constitutional ill is not cured simply by commingling two similarly 
disadvantaged groups (the Negroes and the Mexican Americans), both of 
which are substantially segregated from the more advantaged group, which 
in this case is the Anglo American population.”284  As a result, Judge Seals 
indicated that Mexican American and black students should not be counted 
separately.  Because Mexican American and black students had educational 
experiences that were inferior to the educational experiences of white 
students, Judge Seals held the entire Corpus Christi school system 
unconstitutionally segregated regardless of the racial concentration in a few 
particular schools.285  His order included not only a plan for limited busing, 
but also the creation of a “human relations commission” that had equal 
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membership from the city’s Mexican American, African American, and 
Anglo groups.286   
Despite important analytical differences, both Judge Doyle’s and Judge 
Seals’s opinions ultimately recognized the social complexity of 
constitutional rights brought before the courts.  In their separate ways, both 
judges recognized the challenges of determining rights outside the familiar 
black and white binary.  While Judge Doyle believed it was necessary that 
either black or Mexican Americans represent an overwhelming majority of 
students to determine the segregated nature of a school, Judge Seals was not 
prepared to constitutionally count separately Mexican American and black 
students.   
As a result, these two opinions demonstrated two very different visions of 
court-ordered desegregation in multiracial cities like Denver and Corpus 
Christi.  Courts could examine segregation on a school-by-school racial 
analysis, or they could presume that the system-wide disadvantages 
extended to all non-white groups.  Although he ultimately concluded that 
Corpus Christi’s Mexican American and black students suffered similar 
inequalities when compared to white students, Judge Seals remarked: “We 
are not a homogeneous people; we are a heterogeneous people; we have 
many races, many religions, many colors in America.”287  Indeed, the very 
different needs and issues impacting multiracial groups in the United States 
invariably indicated that no single desegregation remedy would suffice. 
C.  From Theory to Application: Creating a Meaningful National Standard 
of Multiracial Equality 
The months leading up to Judge Doyle’s rulings demonstrated just how 
complicated and fractured racial tensions had become in the Denver area.  
In February 1970, twenty-three Denver Public School buses were destroyed 
and fifteen were damaged by dynamite.288  In that same year, Judge Doyle’s 
house was bombed.289  An editorial in one local newspaper highlighted the 
ways that Denverites might assign blame: 
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The Denver school buses were bombed and burned.  How awful!  
Your first thought might be that the white racist segregationists 
who have fought busing for so long might be at fault. . . . Next, 
your thoughts might turn to blacks who have had bad experiences 
with integration and have become disillusioned.  Your thoughts 
[might then] turn to the Mexican-American community.290    
Rather than apportion responsibility among Denver’s multiracial groups, 
however, the editorial further noted that such acts have “been done even in 
Denver, and if you look around you, it is being done over and over again 
throughout the United States.”291  It was becoming apparent that the issue of 
equality and the multiracial battle for civil rights was not unique to Denver.  
Accordingly, the Keyes case took on heightened significance for the manner 
by which the court would balance all of the competing multiracial interests.  
At the center of the issue was the extent to which the experiences of 
multiracial groups were fundamentally the same.  In their brief to the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, the plaintiffs in Keyes challenged the separation 
of Hispanos and Negroes in Judge Doyle’s remedy by arguing that the trial 
court, “for the first time as a principle in constitutional law,” established 
“that segregation exists only when it is of one race at a time . . . . The 
precedent, . . . if allowed to stand, would have broad restrictive application 
in cities all over the country.”292  Simply put, the plaintiffs asked whether 
the effects of discrimination for different minority groups were the same, 
and if not, what were the implications of requiring a separate determination 
of inequality for Mexican Americans as opposed to blacks and other 
disadvantaged groups?  
In their decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals indirectly addressed 
the plaintiffs’ argument by affirming Judge Doyle’s ruling with respect to 
black schools in one Denver neighborhood, but the court reversed his ruling 
with respect to the Hispano and black core-city schools.293  According to the 
Tenth Circuit, Denver Public School Board discrimination concerning 
concentrated African American schools did not create a presumption of 
unconstitutionality in the entire school district of concentrated black or 
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Mexican American schools.294  Because of the Tenth Circuit’s belief that 
the concentration of African American and Chicano students in the core-city 
was the result of race-neutral polices,295 the court indicated the extent to 
which that racial animus had to be specifically proven by either one of these 
groups.296  Although black and Chicano students were individually and 
collectively concentrated in core-city schools, the various, and at times 
differing, positions taken by the DPS Board and its administration toward 
these two communities obscured the nature of the racial discrimination 
throughout the entire district.     
The Keyes plaintiffs filed a writ of certiorari to the United States 
Supreme court to review  the Tenth Circuit’s final judgment and opinion.297  
In opposition to the writ, the DPS legal team argued that the “case has no 
significant national implications . . . largely because . . . [the] facts . . . vary 
from district to district.”298  Such facts included Denver’s social and 
neighborhood distribution along African American, Chicano, and Anglo 
lines.  The emergence of Mexican Americans and other ethnic minorities in 
school desegregation jurisprudence, however, compelled the Supreme Court 
to reject such reasoning.299  The court heard oral arguments in October 1972 
and made their decision in June 1973.300 
For the first time in its post-Brown school desegregation jurisprudence, 
the Supreme Court did not deliver a unanimous ruling in the case.301  
Instead, the Supreme Court was sharply divided over the extent that 
constitutionally permitted segregation had taken place “in a school district 
the size of Denver’s.”302  Part of the Court’s division rested on the degree to 
which constitutionally impermissible discrimination could be inferred 
outside of a black and white social context.303  Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion confronted this decision early when he declared: “Unlike cities in 
the American South, Denver is tri-ethnic, as distinguished from a bi-racial, 
community.”304  Justice Brennan assessed the usefulness of Judge Doyle’s 
decision not to count Negroes and Hispanos together in order “to establish 
the segregated character of a school.”305   
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Justice Brennan’s analysis of this issue did not rely on evidence showing 
that Hispano and black schools in Denver were inferior to Anglo schools.  
Instead, Justice Brennan utilized a series of late 1960s and early 1970s 
United States Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) studies on the 
experiences of Mexican American students in the states of Arizona, 
California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas.306  The studies found 
widespread social and cultural segregation of Mexican American students 
throughout the school districts of these states.307   
In evaluating the findings of the USCCR on Mexican Americans, Justice 
Brennan repositioned the racial stance of Mexican Americans in 
constitutional law.  Citing Hernández, Justice Brennan unambiguously 
indicated that “Hispanos constitute an identifiable class for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”308  Justice Brennan’s analysis, however, 
suggested that this class could not be considered another white group; 
instead, he stated that there was “much evidence that in the Southwest, 
Hispanos and Negroes have a great many things in common.”309  Most 
importantly, according to Justice Brennan, “Negroes and Hispanos in 
Denver suffer identical discrimination in treatment when compared with the 
treatment afforded Anglo students.”310  This conclusion allowed Justice 
Brennan and the majority of the United States Supreme Court to argue that 
discrimination against one non-white group, of which Hispanos were now a 
part, created a presumption of discrimination against other non-white 
groups in tri-ethnic Denver.311  Although such reasoning allowed the 
Supreme Court to have a more expansive definition of racial discrimination 
in a rapidly transforming and heterogeneous United States, it collapsed 
important differences between racialized groups around a color line.  
Particularly for Denver’s Chicano and black student bodies, it invariably 
complicated any attempt to provide an effective and multifaceted remedy.      
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D.  Busing, Bilingual-Bicultural Education, and the Legal Limits of Equal 
Protection 
In responding to the Supreme Court’s disposition of Keyes, Judge Doyle 
ordered the DPS Board to desegregate the entire school system “root and 
branch.” 312  Accordingly, Judge Doyle worked to fashion a remedy that 
addressed the unique needs of Denver’s tri-ethnic student population.313  In 
his desegregation plan, Judge Doyle not only ordered a traditional busing 
remedy, but on the recommendation of the Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), he ordered the adoption of a 
bilingual and multicultural plan instead of “racial balancing” in certain 
schools.314   
Significantly, MALDEF did not join the litigation until after the United 
States Supreme Court made its 1973 decision.315  For Chicano educators 
and parents, Justice Brennan’s recognition of Denver as a tri-ethnic city 
indicated the need for Mexican American students to have their own 
advocate in the case.316  Thus, MALDEF took a position that racially 
juxtaposed Chicano students with blacks and whites.  According to 
MALDEF, the Keyes plaintiffs, “who [were] primarily black, and their 
counsel lack[ed] exposure to the diverse problems that confront[ed] the 
Chicano community.”317  Although both Justice Brennan and the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights argued that blacks and Hispanos shared 
similar discriminatory treatment, MALDEF argued that the competing 
interests and the different needs of the two communities mandated that 
Chicanos, as their own racially categorized group, have their own distinct 
interests represented.318   
According to MALDEF, the “issues presented to the Court have clearly 
been  black- dominated.”319  Similarly, MALDEF noted that “Chicanos 
cannot be counted as whites for any purpose” in school desegregation.320  In 
the words of MALDEF, as a non-white and non-black group, Chicano 
students and their distinct racial interests promised to cause a 
metamorphosis in constitutional law—one in which the distinct racial rights 
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of Chicanos needed to be recognized and incorporated into the legal 
analysis and remedy.321  As a consequence, MALDEF created its own 
integration policy to specifically protect the needs of the Mexican American 
students.  The MALDEF proposal, known as the “Cardeñas Plan,” 
represented the spirit of the Mexican American students, parents, and 
activists who opposed large-scale busing and supported neighborhood 
schools.322  Through its provisions for the teaching of Chicano studies as 
well as the implementation of a comprehensive bilingual educational 
program, the Cardeñas Plan attempted to institutionalize, at the 
constitutional level, many of the same integration demands made by 
Denver’s Chicano and other non-white students when they walked out of 
their schools in 1969.323     
As a result, the Cardeñas Plan attempted to chart the distinct needs of 
Chicano students who would be most burdened by traditional bi-racial 
desegregation remedies.  As MALDEF noted that “the burden of busing at 
the high school level is placed upon minority students.  Although minorities 
constitute only one-third of the [DPS’s] high school students, minorities 
will comprise more than three out of every four high school students bused 
from satellite areas to main attendance areas.”324  Thus, the Cardeñas Plan 
submitted by MALDEF contemplated desegregation in terms that were very 
different than the racial balance philosophy advocated by the courts.   
At the center of the Cardeñas Plan rested a commitment to bilingual and 
multicultural programs at every level of the school system.325  According to 
MALDEF and Dr. Cardeñas, such programs positively and effectively 
fostered a social identity that they hoped would develop a wholesome 
respect for the intrinsic worth of every individual.326  In crafting such a 
plan, MALDEF and Dr. Cardeñas reimagined a new role for cultural 
pluralism in not only the educational process, but also in combating racial 
inequality.  In this sense, cultural pluralism did not mean “Chicano History 
Week” or a section of the semester devoted to multiracial issues.  Rather, 
the Cardeñas Plan contemplated a complete re-centering of the educational 
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process from history and music courses to language instruction and 
economic education that would integrate the Chicano student into a 
multicultural and multiracial American society.   
In addition, the Cardeñas Plan, which was ultimately accepted by Judge 
Doyle, rejected one of the major premises of school desegregation 
litigation—the idea that white students and their culture would lift minority 
students out of poverty, indifference, and inferiority.327  Instead, the 
Cardeñas Plan advocated that the equality interests of the Chicano students 
would be best served by allowing them to learn about, identify with, and 
eventually emulate and celebrate their own racial and cultural heroes.328  In 
these terms, integration into American society meant a legal and social 
recognition of Chicanos as a distinct and separate racial group apart from 
the nation’s black and white communities. 
Perhaps the greatest indicator of the extent of the strength of MALDEF’s 
argument is reflected in Judge Doyle’s own changing terminology in the 
case.  No longer referring to Mexican American students as “Hispanos” in 
his decisions after 1973, Judge Doyle believed that the Cardeñas Plan 
“[was] particularly appropriate for the Denver school system because of the 
[C]ity and the region’s long tradition of Mexican and Chicano 
influences.”329  In adopting the Cardeñas Plan and responding directly to the 
unique needs and historical experiences of Chicano students and their 
parents, Judge Doyle held strongly to his original ruling that African 
American and Chicano school segregation was different.330  Judge Doyle’s 
change in terminology suggested a new understanding of multiracial 
differences in desegregation litigation and constitutional law.  His 
multifaceted remedy contemplated the possibility that a constitutional 
remedy appropriate to one racial group may not be as effective when 
applied to another racial group.  The Cardeñas Plan recognized an 
opposition of interests between non-white groups, even though their 
racialized experiences produced similar results.    
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Judge Doyle’s attempt to provide a truly tri-ethnic remedy was 
challenged and immediately appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.331 Not surprisingly, the Cardeñas Plan was a highly contentious 
issue.  For instance, the Colorado State Board of Education charged that 
“the process of desegregation [was] explicitly subordinated to the bilingual-
bicultural program.  The Cardeñas [P]lan . . . can be viewed as fostering a 
dual system—one for Chicanos and one for Anglos.”332  Indeed, the 
Colorado State Board of Education categorically rejected cultural pluralism 
in its schools because it would “force the philosophical and sociological 
principles of one group upon all the people of the [s]tate of Colorado.”333  
Once a viable solution to racial and ethnic tension in schools, cultural 
pluralism, as defined by MALDEF and Dr. Cardeñas, became an 
“ostensibly utopia-seeking” solution.334  The Cardeñas Plan was even 
challenged by the Keyes plaintiffs.  According to their counsel, Gordon 
Griener, “the trial court has concluded . . . that it is constitutionally 
permissible to substitute bilingual programs for desegregation.”335  
Although the Keyes plaintiffs had asked for a remedy that prepared Denver 
students to “live in a multiracial world,”336 they were not prepared to 
abrogate either the definition of integration or an appropriate response to 
such an end.  
Such arguments carried quite a bit of weight and the Tenth Circuit 
rejected the Cardeñas Plan as an appropriate desegregation remedy.337  The 
court noted that the Cardeñas Plan “requires an overhaul of the system’s 
entire approach to the education of minorities; its proposals extend to 
matters of educational philosophy, governance, instructional scope and 
sequence, curriculum, student evaluation, staffing, non-instructional service 
and community involvement.”338   
Although the Tenth Circuit failed to explain how the traditional 
desegregation remedies did not disrupt the educational system, the court 
made clear that bilingual and multicultural education “is not a substitute for 
desegregation.”339  Most importantly, the Tenth Circuit rejected the 
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complexity of post-World War II struggles among African Americans and 
Mexican Americans to achieve equality of educational opportunity in the 
Denver Public Schools.  As a consequence, the court dramatically limited 
the implications of the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision and Judge Doyle’s 
subsequent tri-ethnic remedy by failing to approve a remedy beyond the 
traditional busing and racial balanceing approach.340   
The Tenth Circuit explained that “[t]he clear implication of arguments in 
support of the court’s adoption of the Cardeñas Plan is that minority 
students are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment to an educational 
experience tailored to their unique cultural and development needs.  
Although enlightened educational theory may well demand as much, the 
Constitution does not.”341  While Chicanos were now considered black for 
purposes of constitutional law, it was evident that courts were not prepared 
to provide a remedy that contemplated their own distinct non-white and 
non-black racial identity.342   At the same time that the court dramatically 
limited the ability of the Denver Public Schools to overcome the tri-ethnic 
racial lines of the city, many Denver parents worked to preserve Denver’s 
racial boundaries.343  To illustrate, “some grumbled and talked of organizing 
an alternate school system.  Some moved to the suburbs; others put their 
children in private institutions.”344  Still others turned to often violent and 
extralegal means to maintain the heterogeneity of their neighborhoods and 
schools.345  By 1974, anti-integrationists used the city’s tri-racial divisions 
to encourage Colorado citizens to pass the Poundstone Amendment to the 
Colorado State Constitution.346   
Touted by its supporters as a measure to deprive Denver of power over 
the metropolitan area, the Poundstone Amendment greatly limited the 
ability of the city to acquire land through annexation in order to end 
metropolitan educational segregation.347  One editorial noted, 
It is, I think, right to suppose that the primary reason for the easy 
passage of the Poundstone Amendment was the suburbs’ fear of 
busing.  If, in other words, there is to be a ghetto, and busing is to 
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relieve the pressures and injustice of the ghetto, let it all be within 
the City and County—and school district—of Denver.”348   
According to one study, the Amendment allowed “Colorado voters 
permanently [to] split Denver from its suburbs in the 1974 election.  
Suburbanites decided that remaining separate from the city would permit 
them to maintain racially and economically segregated communities and 
schools, and to thereby evade the social and economic problems of the 
central city.”349  In 1975, bi-racial tensions (white versus “non-white”) 
divided the metropolitan area while tri-racial differences, forged in the years 
and decades after World War II, invariably complicated efforts to achieve 
legal and social equality in the city.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Shortly after January 1, 1969, the Denver Chamber of Commerce and the 
Denver School Board distributed a joint memo to Denver’s business and 
industrial community.  Headlined “Here could lie a potentially great city!” 
the memo included a drawing of a cemetery with gravestones for Detroit, 
Newark, Watts, Chicago, and New York City.  Situated prominently in the 
center of the image sat a gravestone that read:  “DENVER: BORN–1859, 
DIED–1969.  CAUSE OF DEATH, SEGREGATED EDUCATION.”350   
Less than a year later, the slow death knell for the city seemed to be 
underway.  The most prominent indicator of Denver’s demise centered on 
the intense passions raised by school desegregation.  While Denver Public 
School buses and Judge Doyle’s house were bombed, Denverites were 
bitterly divided over the social, political, and legal meaning of integration.    
The “Great City” envisioned by the Denver Chamber of Commerce and 
the Denver School Board eroded further through the city’s multiracial 
tensions.  Although white and non-white school desegregation issues 
received the most publicity in the 1970s, violence in Denver’s Chicano and 
black communities also harkened unsavory images of Harlem, Detroit, and 
Los Angeles.  In 1973, for instance, a nearly four-hour gun battle between 
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Chicano activists affiliated with the Crusade for Justice and Denver Police 
culminated in the death of a young Chicano man and the explosion of an 
apartment building.351  
Throughout the 1970s, Denver’s Chicano activists repeatedly clashed 
with the police over the issues of guns, bombs, violence, and brutality.352  
By the 1980s, health, education, and welfare “became a lower priority for 
Denver and the nation as a whole.  The gap between rich and poor 
expanded, and the percentage of people living below the poverty line grew 
at an alarming rate.”353  In the realm of education, only 43 percent of 
Chicanos completed high school.354  Moreover, the Poundstone Amendment 
and other state policies limiting Denver’s growth had a significant 
economic and demographic impact on the metropolitan area.355 As a result, 
Denver was unable to expand and to develop highly profitable commercial 
and residential properties.356  According to one study, these developments 
ensured that Denver was “denied . . . substantial numbers of middle-class 
and affluent residents who might have provided resources . . . for the city 
and its schools” as well as the fiscal benefits that would have resulted from 
commercial and residential development.357  The Poundstone Amendment 
allowed Denver’s suburbanites to decide “that remaining separate from the 
City would permit them to maintain racially and economically segregated 
communities and schools, and to evade the social and economic problems 
of the central city.”358   
The multiracial transformation of Denver in the second half of the 
twentieth century and subsequent battles continue to this very day.  
Although the Keyes case officially ended in 1996, the battle for educational 
equality in the city’s public schools remains heated.  Not surprisingly, the 
racial character of the city lies at the heart of many debates.  Denverites, as 
well as most Americans, still cannot agree on a common understanding of 
the meaning of race and equality in the metropolis.  Were differences that 
remained in Denver and American society the result of racial ideologies, or 
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were they the result of other factors, including ethnicity and economic 
status?   
In a recent editorial, the Rocky Mountain News highlighted the inability 
to answer such questions when it declared that a 2004 study was “nonsense” 
when the study alleged that Denver and Colorado schools were among the 
least integrated in the nation, especially for Hispanic students.359  According 
to the article, the reality of segregation in Denver’s public schools is “in fact 
. . . a lot less ominous than its principal author would have us believe” as a 
result of “huge influx of Hispanic immigrants [in the 1990s] . . . [who] 
tended to cluster in the same neighborhoods rather than disperse throughout 
the city.  It would be miraculous under such circumstances if many schools 
hadn’t found themselves with far greater concentrations of ‘minority’ 
students. . . . The challenge isn’t ethnicity these days; it’s socioeconomic 
status.”360  The Rocky Mountain News analysis, however, failed to consider 
that in the 1940s and 1950s, a similar demographic influx of both Mexican 
Americans and African Americans created segregated schools.  While 
socioeconomic status was certainly a factor in this development, it is 
important to remember that the extreme racial categorization of the groups 
and the legal and social barriers that were in place ensured that neither 
group would be able to effectively enter mainstream American society.  
The issue, then and today, is not socioeconomic status, ethnicity, or some 
other social factor, but rather a recognition of the multiracial color lines and 
identities that emerged in post-World War II United States.  Significantly, 
these were lines and identities that were given meaning by the complicated 
interplay of law and social change, which were represented most vividly in 
the context of school desegregation in Denver.    
The struggle for equality of educational opportunity and the recent 
histories of demographically diverse post-war urban cities gave courts an 
unprecedented opportunity to develop principles, methodologies, and 
understandings of the multiracial character of the law.  Keyes provided such 
an opportunity.  Although most studies of the Keyes decision have focused 
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on the case’s distinction between de jure versus de facto discrimination in 
constitutional law, there is little commentary on the Court’s analysis of 
Denver’s multiracial student body.361  The extended treatment of the issue at 
both the trial court and the Supreme Court, however, altered not only the 
dynamics of the desegregation struggle but also recognized, for a moment, a 
multiracial United States. 
Although Denver’s diverse racial populations challenged the usefulness 
of the black-white dichotomy in constitutional law, the Tenth Circuit’s 
rejection of Judge Doyle’s desegregation remedy ensured that Chicanos 
never seriously threatened the polarized premises of American 
jurisprudence.  In the legal battle to desegregate Denver’s schools, Mexican 
Americans were consistently described in relation to their relative whiteness 
or blackness, not their Chicanoness.  Whether they were considered “other 
white” or, more recently, “other black,” Mexican American students were 
denied a viable constitutional remedy and were left to compete with African 
Americans for limited resources in non-white Denver. 
The attempt of Denver students, parents, educators, activists, lawyers, 
and judges to come to grips with its multiracialized citizenry suggests the 
challenges facing a demographically changing United States.  The equality 
claims of Denver’s diverse student body vividly demonstrated the extent 
that all these groups not only distinguished themselves, but also claimed 
legal rights in multiracial terms.  Although in 1973 the United States 
Supreme Court wanted to use tri-ethnic Denver to develop national 
principles of equality, subsequent jurisprudence and legislative acts limited 
the implications of that decision and instead reinforced the bi-racial fiction 
of law.  Thus, despite the efforts of Denver’s Chicanos to declare that their 
“Selma” would take place in the city’s public schools, the law failed to 
appreciate the multiracial transformation of the United States. 
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American,” “Oriental,” and “Indian” students in their schools.  See id.; Watson, supra 
note 2, at 52-53. 
93  REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1964), supra note 83, at Appendix 
9; DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD 
10 (1967); Watson, supra note 3, at 52–53.  DPS officials argued that busing was used 
only in schools and areas where overcrowding was seen as temporary.  In those areas 
where overcrowding was seen as permanent, however, DPS officials sought to use 
temporary mobile units, build additions to schools, or build a new school.  Jack Gaske, 
School Concept Faces Acid Test, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Dec. 21, 1965, at 86.  
Such actions, however, only exacerbated the racial divide when the DPS officials found 
that of the 29 mobile units in use in the entire Denver Public School system, 28 were at 
schools with substantial “Negro” and “Spanish-surnamed” populations.  FINAL REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1967), supra, at 10. 
94  Watson, supra note 3, at 55. 
95  Id. at 70–76; Jack Gaske, Who’s in School: Minority, Majority Ratio Growing 
Stronger, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Mar. 14, 1966, at 6–7. 
96  Greg Phinney, Park Hill’s Racial Schools Problem Stymies Officials, DENVER POST, 
Jan. 19, 1966, at 88. 
97  Id. 
98  Watson, supra note 3, at 69–75. 
99  Gaske, supra note 93, at 86. 
100 Greg Pinney, Study of Segregation Bus Plan Improved, DENVER POST, Jan. 21, 1966, 
at 1, 26; Watson, supra note 3, at 72–75. 
101 Watson, supra note 3, at 76. 
102 These council included members from such groups as the Park Hill Action 
Committee, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the 
Congress of Racial Equality, and the Latin American Research and Service Agency 
(LARASA).  Also included where members of Denver’s professional and municipal 
communities.  Id. at 76. 
103 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1967), supra note 93, at 30. 
104 Id. at 39–40. 
105 Id. at 30. 
106 Id. at 31. 
107 Id. at 35. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 39. 
110 Watson, supra note 3, at 78–82 
111 Id. 
112 FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1967), supra note 93, at 
181. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 184. 
115 Id. 
116 Watson, supra note 3, at 82. 
117 Id. at 82. 
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118 Id. at 94. 
119 Id. 
120 Charles Carter, Integration Ordered: School Board Avoids Bus Issue, DENVER POST, 
May 17, 1968, at 1,4.  See also Negro Teacher Group Plans School Boycott, DENVER 
POST, May 13, 1968; and Busing Should Be Voluntary, THE UNIVERSITY PARK NEWS-
CHERRY CREEK NEWS (Denver), May 9, 1968, in ADL Collection, Box 17, FF 7. 
121 Watson, supra note 3, at 100. 
122 Id. 
123 The School Board Actions, known as Resolution 1520, 1524, and 1531 and enacted by 
the Board respectively on January 30, 1969, March 20, 1969, and April 24, 1969, targeted 
specifically those schools in East and Northeast Denver with large “African American” 
communities.  See id. at 107–108.  Id. at 109. 
124 Id. at 108. 
125 Id. at 109.  To get a sense of the intense passion revolving around the DPS’ school 
desegregation resolutions, see School Integration—I: Part-Time or Full Time?, DENVER 
POST, Sept. 19, 1968; Charles Carter, Panel Hears Talks Backing Integration, DENVER 
POST, Sept. 27, 1968, at 35; Charles Carter, School Plan Criticism Mounts, DENVER 
POST, Nov. 27, 1968; If It’s Change, They’re Against It, DENVER POST, Nov. 26, 1968, at 
20. 
126 See Romero, supra note 18, at ch. VII. 
127 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1964), supra note 83, at 4–5; 
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE BOARD (1967), supra note 93, at 11. 
128 Carter, supra note 1, at 1. 
129 Id. 
130 Martin Moran, Charges Against Teacher Are Called Unfounded, ROCKY MTN. NEWS 




134 Prelude to Disturbance: Complaint Against Teacher, DENVER POST, Mar. 20, 1969, at 
3.  Later, Shafer backed away from these comments and argued, instead, that he was 
misquoted and that his statements were taken out of context.  Fred Giles & Bob Huber, 
Teacher Caught in West Storm Gets Student Backing, DENVER POST, Mar. 30, 1969. 
135 See Bob Saile, Teacher Hub in Controversy, DENVER POST, Mar. 21, 1969; Moran, 
supra note 130; Giles & Huber, supra note 134. 
136 Saile, supra note 135, at 46. 
137 Moran, supra note 130; Saile, supra note 135, at 46. 





143 Id.; Duane Howell & Ira Gay Sealy, Clash at West High, DENVER POST, Mar. 20. 
1969, at 68; SDS Urges Support of West Students, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Mar. 
22, 1969, at 8. 
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144 Prelude to Disturbance, supra note 132, at 3. 
145 Howell & Sealy, supra note 143, at 68. 
146 There is some question about whether other students joined the march and 
demonstration.  Mainstream newspaper accounts indicate that only West High students 
participated in the walkouts.  See id.  Bill Marvel, West High School Students and Police 
Fight, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Mar. 21, 1969, at 1.  Other accounts, however, 
indicate a much fuller participation.  See ERNESTO VIGIL, THE CRUSADE FOR JUSTICE: 
CHICANO MILITANCY AND THE GOVERNMENT’S WAR ON DISSENT 83 (1999). 
147 VIGIL, supra note 146, at 83. 
148 Marvel, supra note 146, at 1, 5. 
149 Id. at 1 
150 Id. 
151 SDS Urges Support of West Students, supra note 143, at 8. 
152 VIGIL, supra note 146, at 85. 
153 George Kane, One Man Shot in New Violence at West High, ROCKY MTN. NEWS 
(Denver), Mar. 22, 1969, at 5 (emphasis added).  See VIGIL, supra note 146, at 85. 
154 See VIGIL, supra note 144, at 85; Duane Howell et al., From East to Manual to West, 
DENVER POST, Mar. 21, 1969, at 72; Militants Join Move for Boycott at West, DENVER 
POST, Mar. 21, 1969, at 1. 
155 Kane, supra note 153, at 5. 
156 Militants Join Move, supra note 152, at 1. 
157 Bob Jain, 400 Support School Boycott, DENVER POST, Mar. 21, 1969, at 46.  Like the 
previous day’s events, however, the demonstration was again marred by violence.  As 
police and demonstrators again clashed, one man was shot as Denver Police armed 
themselves with shotguns, filled with birdshot, to protect themselves and “private 
citizens” who were “pinned down” by the “ranging (sic) mobs.”  Kane, supra note 151, at 
5; Birdshot Fired by Police Answers Rock Barrage: 1 Wounded in Skirmish Near West, 
DENVER POST, Mar. 22, 1969.  Walkouts by “Chicano/a” students were also reported at a 
few schools in “suburban” Adams and Arapahoe counties.  See VIGIL, supra note 146, at 
87.  Although violence between police and students did not escalate further, racial 
tensions not only in West, but throughout the city remained high.  Indeed, for the 
remainder of the school year, “shot-gun wielding police offices were stationed inside” 
West High School.  George Kane, Parents Present Demands at West High, ROCKY MTN. 
NEWS (Denver), Mar. 25, 1969, at 5. 
158 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
159 Violence at West High School, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Mar. 23, 1969, at 6.  See 
also John Dunning, West Incident Laid to Small Minority, DENVER POST, Mar. 25, 1969, 
at 1; Bill Myers, Police Chief Ties Adults to Violence, DENVER POST, Mar. 25, 1969, at 3. 
160 Kane, supra note 153, at 5. 
161 Gene Cooper, Hispano Demands Partly Won, DENVER POST, March 26, 1969.  See 
also Minority Unit Unified, School Board Warned, DENVER POST, Mar. 26, 1969. 
162 Alan Cunningham, Hispanos Push for Unity to Effect School Change, ROCKY MTN. 
NEWS (Denver), Mar. 24, 1969, at 8. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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165 See also Minority Area Teacher Call for School Funds, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 1969. 
166 Martin Moran, Gilberts Answers Quest For West High Changes, ROCKY MTN. NEWS 
(Denver), Mar. 27, 1969, at 5–6.  See also Gene Cooper, Hispano Demands Partly Won, 
DENVER POST, Mar. 26, 1969, at 1. 
167 Bob Huber, Return to School, Gonzales Says, DENVER POST, Mar. 28, 1969, at 27. 
168 Colorado and several other states were especially influenced by the United States’ 
Congress passage in 1968 of the Bilingual Education Act as a new provision of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.  Accordingly, the act authorized funds 
for local school districts to enact bilingual education programs.  Bilingual Education Act 
of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-247, 81 Stat. 783 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 7401-
7491 (2000)). 
169 Calvin Trillin, Doing the Right Thing in Denver, NEW YORKER MAG., May 31, 1969. 
170 Watson, supra note 3, at 109. 
171 Trillin, supra note 169. 
172 Id. 
173 Watson, supra note 3, at 111. 
174 Id.; See also Harold Jackson, Discrimination and Busing: The Denver School Board 
Election, 8 ROCKY MTN. SOC. SCI. J. 102–107 (1971). 
175 Watson, supra note 3, at 111. 
176 Id. 
177 Two of the named and racially described plaintiffs, “Negro” Kris Colley, and 
“Hispano” Carlos Perez, respectively attended East and West High Schools—schools that 
were at the center over the battle to eliminate discriminating and bias from Denver’s 
schools during the 1950s and 1960s.  Complaint for Permanent Injunction and 
Declaratory Judgment, June 19, 1969, in Keyes Collection, Box 4, Book 1, Vol. 1. 
178 Wikepedia, The Free Encyclopedia, Dwight D. Eisenhower, at  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dwight_D._Eisenhower (last visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
179 See Roscoe Drummond, Ike: A Great American, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 1969, at 12. 
180 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
181 Tom Cadwallader, Racial Confrontation, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 1969, at 12; Roy 
Wilkens, Racial Separation Can Only Lead to Racial Inequality, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 
1969, at 12. 
182 Cadwallader, supra note 181, at 12. 
183 See, e.g., DUDZIAK, supra note 20, at 115–151. 
184 Fred Thomas, War on Unequal Education Will Continue in Denver, DENVER POST, 
May 28, 1969. 
185 Id. (emphasis added). 
186 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 177. 
187 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191, 195. 
188 Their concerns rested in the pattern of school board decisions that contributed to 
racially concentrated Black schools extending northeast from Five Points to Park Hill.  
See Romero, supra note 24, ch. VIII generally, notes 42–73 and accompanying text.  
Although the lawyers recognized that a case existed against the Denver Public School 
system, they did not have the time nor the resources to prosecute such a large case.  
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Accordingly, the lawyers contacted Denver law firms who had the resources to take the 
case on a pro-bono basis. Watson, supra note 3, at 112. 
189 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191. 
190 Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 177. 
191 Keyes, 303 F. Supp. 279, 288 (D. Colo. 1969). 
192 Hernández v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954). 
193 Christopher Jencks, Busing—The Supreme Court Goes North, N. Y. TIMES 
(Magazine), Nov. 19, 1972. 
194  Keyes, 413 U.S. at 195–196 . 
195  See Romero, supra note 24, at 431–440. 
196  IAN F. HANEY-LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996).  
The term “prerequisite” refers to the 1790 Naturalization requirement that naturalization 
be restricted to “White persons.”  Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.  The 
requirement was repealed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 311, ch. 2, 
66 Stat. 239 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1422 (1988)). 
197  HANEY-LÓPEZ, supra note 196, at 203–208 (Appendix A). 
198  See id. at chs. 2–3. 
199  In re Rodriguez, 81 Fed. 337, 349 (W.D. Tex. 1897). 
200  Id. 
201  Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 95 n. 5 (1933). 
202  In the case, the Supreme Court held that a Mississippi “colored” school desegregation 
statute was properly applied to an American citizen of “pure Chinese blood.”  Gong Lum 
v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85 (1927). 
203  Id. 
204  Id. at 87 
205  Clare Sheridan, ‘Another White Race:’ Mexican Americans and the Paradox of 
Whiteness in Jury Selection, 21 LAW AND HIST. REV. 109, 111 (2003). 
206  Id. at 118–122. 
207  Id. at 120 (citing Sanchez v. Texas, 243 S.W. 2d 700 (1951), Rogers v. Texas, 236 
S.W. 2d 141 (1951); Bustillos v. Texas, 213 S.W. 2d 837 (1948); Salazar v. Texas, 193 
S.W. 2d  211 (1946), Sanchez v. Texas, 181 S.W. 2d 87 (1944); Lugo v. Texas, 124 S.W. 
2d 344 (1939); Carrasco v. Texas, 95 S.W. 2d 433 (1936); and, Ramirez v. Texas, 40 
S.W. 2d 138 (1931)). 
208  See, e.g., MARTHA MENCHACA, RECOVERING HISTORY, CONSTRUCTING RACE: THE 
INDIAN, BLACK, AND WHITE ROOTS OF MEXICAN AMERICANS 285–296 (2001); DAVID 
MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836–1986, at 157–
256 (1987). 
209  Sheridan, supra note 205, at 120; Ian Haney-López, Race, Ethnicity, Erasure: The 
Salience of Race to Lat Crit Theory, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1143, 1166–1170 (1997). 
210  Lueras v. Town of Lafayette, 100 Colo. 124, 124–25 (1937). 
211  The Court, however, failed to discuss the fact that the town of Lafayette had virtually 
no “Negroes,” Chinese, or Japanese citizens. Id.  The largest single identifiable 
“minority” group was “Spanish-American.”  Id. at 125–126. 
212  Id. at 126, 
213  Sheridan, supra note 205, at 120. 
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214  Id. 
215  Id.; Haney-López, supra note 209, at 1166–1170; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886). 
216  Robert R. Alvarez, Jr., The Lemon Grove Incident: The Nation’s First Successful 
School Desegregation Cases, J. OF SAN DIEGO HIST. 116 (1986). 
217  Id. 
218  Id. (the case was never appealed). 
219  Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 33 S.W. 2d 790, 795 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1930). 
220  GILBERT G. GONZALEZ, CHICANO EDUCATION IN THE ERA OF SEGREGATION 118–
120 (1990); see also Kristi Bowman, The New Face of School Desegregation, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1751, 1772 (2001). 
221  Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange County v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947). 
222  Id. at 780; Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange County, 64 F. Supp. 544, 546 
(S.D. Cal. 1946). 
223  Mendez, 161 F.2d at 780. 
224  Id. at 781 n. 7. 
225  Id. at 780. 
226  Id. at 781. 
227  Id. at 780–81. 
228  Hernández, 347 U.S. at 478. 
229  Id. at 478–479. 
230  Id. at 478. 
231  Id. 
232  Id. at 478–479. 
233  Sheridan, supra note 205, at 131. 
234  Brown, 347 U.S. at 483. 
235  Bowman, supra note 220, at 1776. 
236  Id.  See also Steven H. Wilson, Brown Over ‘Other White:’ Mexican Americans’ 
Legal Arguments and Litigation Strategy in School Desegregation Lawsuits, 21 LAW 
AND HIST. REV. 145, 164 (2003). 
237  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Lau v. Nichols, 
414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
238  See Wilson, supra note 236, at 173–190. 
239  See infra Part III and accompanying notes 126–181; see also VIGIL, supra note 146, 
at 94–100. 
240  See, e.g., Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 324 F. Supp. 599 (S.D. Tex. 
1970) (filed in late 1968).  In places such as Texas, some school districts, to get around 
Brown, assigned “Mexican American” and “African Americans” to the same schools and 
argued that such schools were integrated. GUADALUPE SAN MIGUEL, JR., “LET THEM 
ALL TAKE HEED:” MEXICAN AMERICANS AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR EDUCATIONAL 
EQUALITY IN TEXAS 1910–1981, at 175–177 (1987). 
241  Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 177, at 1. 
242  Id. at 1–2. 
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243  Id. at 1–2 (emphasis added).  The racial implications of the case were further 
accentuated by the interests of self-described “White” “tax-paying” Denverites.  In their 
motion to intervene in the case, these citizens declared that the desegregation plans of the 
DPS Board discriminated against “White” children by unnecessarily exposing them to 
traffic hazards; requiring them to spend more time going to and from school; removing 
them from the familiar surroundings of their neighborhoods and homes; depriving them 
of benefits of attending neighborhood schools; as well as not being able to participate in 
all school activities which are available to other students within the school district.  
Accordingly, these “White” “tax-paying” interveners argued that “it is constitutionally 
impermissible to discriminate against a [W]hite person” in favor of other “minority” 
groups.  Intervening Defendants’ Memorandum Brief, in Keyes Collection, Box 4, Book 
3, at 4–7. 
244  Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Declaratory Judgment, supra note 177, at 8–
14.  Watson, supra note 3, at 127–137, 142–150. 
245  Watson, supra note 3, at 127–137, 142–150. 
246  Id. at 142–143. 
247  Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 313 F. Supp. 61, 74 (D.C. Colo. 1970). 
248  Id. 
249  Id. 
250  Id. 
251  Id. 
252  Id. 
253  Watson, supra note 3, at 146. 
254  Id. 
255  Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 76. 
256  Id.; Importantly, the Court cited several recent 10th circuit decisions that rejected so-
called “de facto” segregation in schools.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 375 F.2d 158 (10th 
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931 (1967); Downs v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.2d 988 (10th 
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965). 
257  Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 77. 
258  Id. 
259  Id.  (see table). 
260  Id. 
261  In many of the schools that the court looked at Whites, Black and Mexican Americans 
individually constituted sizable, but by no means overwhelming majorities or minorities.   
For example, the court looked at Boulevard, Crofton, Ebert, Garden Place, Gilpin, Wyatt, 
and Wyman elementary schools, Baker and Morey junior high schools, and East, West, 
and Manual high schools. 
262  Doyle grew up in Denver’s westside in the 1910s. Once the center of Denver’s “Irish-
American” community, the neighborhood had transitioned to a largely “Mexican 
American” community in the years following World War II.  During his youth, Doyle 
attended West High School.  In 1937, Doyle graduated from George Washington 
University Law School.  He returned to Denver, took the bar and worked in both private 
practice and as a deputy district attorney for Denver.  After serving in World War II, 
Doyle returned to Denver and resumed his private practice while he was also an adjunct 
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lecturer at Denver’s Westminster Law School, the University of Denver, and the 
University of Colorado.  In 1947, Doyle served as a delegate to the Denver Charter 
Convention.  In 1948, Doyle filled a two-month vacancy on the Denver District Court 
bench.  As a Democrat, Doyle ran an unsuccessful campaign for a seat on the Colorado 
Supreme Court.  Doyle was elected to the Colorado Supreme Court in 1958 after 
becoming a prominent member of the Democratic party, where he became close to 
Rodolfo “Corky’ Gonzales, and other Chicano and Black Democrats. In 1961, President 
John F. Kennedy appointed Doyle to an opening on the bench of the United States 
District Court, District of Colorado.  See John L. Kane, Jr. & Sharon Marks Elfenbein, 
From Guns to Gavels: A History of the Federal Territorial and District Courts of 
Colorado 82–85 (1991) (unpublished manuscript); see also, Barbara Browne, Political 
Pugilists Cheer Corky’s Cause, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Jan. 9, 1959. 
263  Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 69. 
264  Id. 
265  Id. at 77. 
266  Id. at 69. 
267  Id. at 77 (emphasis added). 
268  Id. at 84.  Two months later, the court added Elyria and Smedley Elementary schools 
to the already identified fifteen “core city” schools.  Keyes, 313 F. Supp. at 96. 
269  Id. at 96–99. 
270  Id. at 98. 
271  Id. 
272  Id. at 97. 
273  Id. 
274  Id. 
275  Such matters in Judge Doyle’s own circuit were further complicated in December 
1969 when the United States District Court, District of New Mexico refused to certify 
Mexican Americans as a class in a school desegregation complaint.  According to the 
New Mexico court: 
The . . . class is designated as ‘Indo-Hispano, also called Mexican-American 
and Spanish- American’. The plaintiffs allege this class is generally 
characterized by having Spanish surnames, Mexican, Indian, and Spanish 
ancestry, and that the class speaks Spanish as a primary or maternal language. 
The complaint alleges that the minors of public school age in the Indo-Hispano 
class constitute over thirty per cent of the children of public school age in the 
State of New Mexico. In connection with this class, the complaint also 
designates a class of ‘non-Indo-Hispano’ meaning only white or Caucasian, or 
Anglo-American. The classes of ‘Indo-Hispano’ or non-Indo-Hispano’, as 
designated in the complaint, do not include either Negroes or Indians. 
Lopez Tijerina v. Henry, 48 F.R.D. 274, 275–76 (D. N.M. 1960).  The plaintiffs 
attempted in this case to define the class using criteria such as Spanish-surname, 
Mexican, Indian and Spanish ancestry, and bilingualism, according to the New Mexico 
District Court, were wholly unworkable and inconsistent given New Mexico’s 
complicated racial and ethnic past.  Id. 
276  Cisneros, 324 F.Supp. at 599. 
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277  Id. 
278  In contrast to Keyes and the Colorado District Court that used the term “Hispanos,” 
Judge Seals used the term “Mexican American” to differentiate this group from Black 
and White students.  Id. at 601. 
279  Id. 
280  Id. at 604. 
281  Id. at 606 n. 27. 
282  Id. at 606. 
283  Judge Seals’ opinion evaluated an overwhelming litany of historical and social 
evidence of discrimination by Whites against Corpus Christi’s Mexican American 
community.  This evidence led him to conclude that Corpus Christi’s Mexican Americans 
were a distinctly identifiable ethnic-minority group who, like African Americans who 
suffered a long history of past and present discrimination in the city.  Judge Seals noted 
that Mexican Americans an African American were not the only groups “susceptible to 
[similar types of] discrimination,” in American history, but Corpus Christi’s own 
historical patterns of discrimination necessitated the finding that discrimination against 
both groups led to a “dual school system.”  Id. at 615.  In making this determination, 
Judge Seals recounted a history of Mexican Americans in Corpus Christi that was 
remarkably similar to that of Denver’s community.    Thus, the collective result of all 
these experiences and actions was the creation of largely Mexican American as well as 
African American schools.  Id. at 605–612, 616–623.  And as in Denver, such 
discrimination and its impact on the Mexican American community was something that 
was impossible to ignore.  As Judge Seals noted, “it seems to this court that . . . Mexican 
American organizations . . . were called into being in response to this problem.  This is 
why, perhaps, we are having so many hearings, so many government commissions 
studying these problems, and so many publications and books being published 
concerning this very real problem.”  Id. at 615. 
284  Id. at 616. 
285  Id. at 626–27. 
286  Id. at 627.  Judge Seals referenced the American South for the value of such 
commissions: 
Because the courts, especially in the South, are finding that a bi-racial or 
human relations committee appointed by the court can aid the school boards 
and the courts through these trying times, and in these complex problems of 
creating a unitary system and maintaining them, this court is of the opinion 
that a human relations committee appointed by this court will be of great help. 
Id. 
287  Id. (emphasis added). 
288  STEPHEN J. LEONARD & THOMAS J. NOEL, DENVER: FROM MINING CAMP TO 
METROPOLIS 380 (1990). 
289  Id. 
290  Madestella C. Holcomb, Equality is the Key, DENVER POST, Feb. 19, 1970. 
291  Id. 
292  Plaintiff’s Opening Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal, in Keyes Collection, Box 4, 
Book 4, at 50. 
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293  Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 445 F. 2d 990, 1002–1006 (10th Cir. 1971). 
294  Id. 
295  Such policies, according to the Tenth Circuit, included the “prevailing educational 
theory of the day” that allowed Black teachers to be placed in minority schools, and the 
refusal of the district to bus minority students from overcrowded schools while approving 
the “busing of Anglo students” in areas recently annexed by the city that did not have 
school buildings.  Id. at 1006. 
296  Id. at 1005. 
297  On Pet. for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, Brief for Respondents in Opposition, Nov. 23, 1971, in Keyes Collection, Box 4, 
Book 6, at 14–15. 
298  Id. 
299  The Fifth Circuit upheld Judge Seals finding that Mexican Americans were a distinct 
minority that suffered a constitutional harm.  Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 
467 F. 2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).The appellate court, 
however, rejected the integration plan formulated by the trial court.  Id.  Based on such 
reasoning, the Fifth Circuit also overturned another district court’s decision to classify 
Mexican American interveners in different school desegregation suit as White.  Ross v. 
Eckels, 467 F. 2d 649 (5th Cir. 1972). 
300  Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
301  Id. at 256. 
302  Id. 
303  Id. at 195. 
304  Id. 
305  Id. at 196. Indeed, the Keyes plaintiff’s argued that the placement for Mexican 
Americans and African American in school desegregation jurisprudence was “a case of 
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